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A Second Redemption?
DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF
BROwN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION. Gary Orfield, Susan E.
Eaton, and the Harvard Project on School Desegregation.




The court-ordered desegregation of America's public schools is nearly
over. In the last ten years, an increasing number of federal district courts have
relinquished jurisdiction over formerly segregated school districts and re-
turned control to local officials.' Consequently, scores of school districts have
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1. See, e.g., Lockettv. Board ofEduc., 111 F.3d 839, 844 (1lth Cir. 1997) (Muscogee
County, Georgia); Reed v. Rhodes, 1 F. Supp. 2d705, 708 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (Cleveland, Ohio);
United States v. Board of Pub. Instr., 977 F. Supp. 1202, 1227 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (St. Lucie
County, Florida); United States v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500,974 F. Supp. 1367,1385 (D. Kan.
1997) (Kansas City, Kansas); Mills v. Freeman, 942 F. Supp. 1449, 1464 (N.D. Ga. 1996)
(DeKalb County, Georgia); Arthurv.Nyquist, 904 F. Supp. 112,120 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (Buffalo,
New York); Keyes v. Congress of Hispanic Educators, 902 F. Supp. 1274, 1307-08 (D. Colo.
1995) (Denver, Colorado); Coalition to Save Our Children v. State Bd. of Educ., 901 F. Supp.
784, 824 (D. Del. 1995) (Wilmington, Delaware), aff'd, 90 F.3d 752 (3d Cir. 1996); Stell v.
Board of Pub. Educ., 860 F. Supp. 1563, 1585 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (Savannah, Georgia); Tasby v.
Woolery, 869 F. Supp. 454,477 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (Dallas, Texas); see also, e.g., Board ofEduc.
v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562, 567-68 (Ct. App. 1998) (approving state trial court's
accelerated termination of jurisdiction over desegregation case involving San Diego Unified
School District); DeNeen L. Brown, Agreement to End Busing Heralds New Era for Schools,
WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 1998, at MI (detailing agreement between Prince George's County,
Maryland, School Board, county executive, and NAACP to end 25-year-old school desegrega-
tion case); Jane DuBose, '60 School Bias Suit Finally Wrapping Up; Plan Is Too Costly,
Nashville Mayor Says, ATLANTA J.-CoNsT., Mar. 1, 1998, atA6 (announcing judicial approval
in January 1998 of settlement of 38-year-old desegregation case in Nashville, Tennessee);
HeinOnline  -- 56 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 169 1999
56 WASH. & LEE L. REV 169 (1999)
abandoned desegregation plans and returned to neighborhood attendance
policies, resulting in a substantial degree of resegregation.2 This retreat has
been fueled, at least in part, by three recent Supreme Court decisions -Board
of Education v. Dowell,3 Freeman v. Pitts,4 and Missouri v. Jenkins.' Al-
though not altering any fundamental legal principles, the decisions evinced a
clear hostility to the continuation of court-ordered desegregation remedies.
In each opinion, the Court emphasized that the judicial supervision of for-
merly segregated school districts was intended to be temporary, and that
federal district courts should return control over public schools to politically
accountable local officials as soon as practicable.6 The Court also stressed
that the permissible objectives of a desegregation plan are quite limited;
desegregation remedies are legally justifiable only to the extent that they
address conditions that are proximately traceable to the original constitutional
violation, even if other racial inequalities or imbalances remain.'
To many, the Court's recent decisions are premature and ill-conceived
Perhaps the most prominent critic has been Gary Orfield, director of the
Michael Grunwald, Charlotte Reopens Book on Court-Ordered Busing, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr.
14, 1998, at Al (reporting that federal court in March 1998 reopened desegregation case in
Charlotte, North Carolina, to determine whether there still exists legal justification for school
district's mandatory reassignmentplan); KristinKing, SchoolBoard'sBattle IsAgainstPercep-
tions, BATON ROUGE ADvOC., Apr. 22, 1998, at 7B (announcing that Baton Rouge School
Board, NAACP, and U.S. Department of Justice reached agreement in August 1996 to end 15
years of mandatory busing, bringing 41-year-old desegregation case to near close); Shelby
Oppel, Board Starts Work on New Definition of Integration, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 6,
1998, at lB (reporting that Pinellas School Board voted in April 1998 to seek end to court-
enforced busing and release from 27-year-old desegregation order in St. Petersburg, Florida).
2. See GARY ORFIELD, SUSAN E. EATON, AND THE HARVARD PROJECT ON SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD
OFEDUCATION21 (1996) (discussing resegregation following court-ordered desegregation in
Oklahoma City, Austin, and Savannah); Davison M. Douglas, The End ofBusing?, 95 MICH.
L.REv. 1715, 1737 (1997) (book review) [hereinafter Douglas, The End ofBusing?] ("In wake
ofthe Court's retreat, America's urban schools are becoming increasingly racially segregated.");
Davison M. Douglas, Justifying Racial Reform, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1163, 1165 n.10 (1998) (book
review) [hereinafter Douglas, Justifying RacialReform] (citing several cases in which this has
occurred).
3. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
4. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
5. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
6. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70,99 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,490
(1992); Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247 (1991).
7. See, e.g.,Freeman, 503 U.S. at491 (statingthat"thedistrictcourtmay determinethat
it will not order further remedies in the area of student assignments where racial imbalance is
not traceable, in a proximate way, to constitutional violations").
8. See, e.g., ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 2; Richard Thompson Ford, Geography and
Sovereignty: JurisdictionalFormation andRacial Segregation, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1386-
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Harvard Project on School Desegregation." In his recent book, Dismantling
Desegregation,"o Orfield, Susan Eaton, and several of their colleagues at the
Harvard Project contend that the Court's decisions over the past twenty-five
years have betrayed the promise of Brown v. Board of Education." This
betrayal began with the Court's 1974 decision in Milliken v. Bradley (Milli-
ken ),2 in which the Court struck down a metropolitan-wide desegregation
remedy in Detroit, and has continued through Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins.
Specifically, in ending or curtailing desegregation remedies, the Court has
made no effort to ensure that the essential command of Brown - that the
victims of past discrimination receive equal educational opportunities - has
been fulfilled.' 3 This abandonment of school desegregation, contends Orfield, 4
is reminiscent of the period following Radical Reconstruction, when the
federal government, in conjunction with several important Supreme Court
decisions, abandoned the cause of civil rights to facilitate regional reconcilia-
tion and southern "home rule."'" Today, federal courts, fatigued by the
perceived ineffectiveness and futility of their efforts, are withdrawing from
the cause of racial equality in public education for the purposes of respecting
the sovereignty and political accountability of state and local authorities,
despite those authorities' proven history of discrimination.
Orfield contends that, despite forty years of court-ordered desegregation,
public education remains largely separate and unequal. American public
schools are as segregated today as they were in 1972, when desegregation was
just beginning in earnest. Moreover, minority students (specifically African
American and Latino children) continue to lag well behind whites in every
measure of academic achievement. Orfield therefore concludes that, contrary
88 (1997); Bradley W. Joondeph, Missouri v. Jenkins andthe De Facto.4bandonment ofCourt-
Enforced Desegregation, 71 WASH. L. REV. 597 (1996); john a. powell, Living andLearning:
LinkingHousing and Education, 80 MINN.L.REV. 749,750-51 (1996); Sharon Elizabeth Rush,
The Heart of Equal Protection: Education and Race, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1
(1997).
9. See Douglas, The End ofBusing?, supra note 2, at 1717 (describing Orfield as "one
of the country's most relentless supporters of school integration").
10. ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 2.
11. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
12. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
13. See ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 75-76.
14. Except where otherwise noted, I refer to Orfield as the author because he alone wrote
the six chapters ofDismantling Desegregation that are the focus of this review essay. Orfield's
six chapters present the normative arguments condemning the Court's recent decisions and sup-
porting the continuation of court-ordered desegregation. The remaining chapters generally
present case studies of the desegregation experience in various school districts. See id at 115-
289.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 117-40.
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to the Court's recent decisions, federal courts should require the continuation
or expansion of desegregation remedies in formerly segregated school dis-
tricts.
Dismantling Desegregation is probably the definitive expression of the
traditional liberal defense of school desegregation, and it makes some salient
points. First, a well developed body of research supports Orfield's basic
premise that desegregation, at least under certain circumstances, has produced
tangible educational benefits for minority children with no detriment to
whites. Controlling for the relevant measurable variables, school desegrega-
tion appears to increase educational achievement for minority students and
enhance their "life chances" as measured by a variety of social indicators. 6
Second, the Court's decisions over the last twenty-five years have clearly
turned away from amore aggressive implementation of court-ordered desegre-
gation remedies. Milliken Iwas indeed a turning point in the Court's desegre-
gation jurisprudence, substantially curtailing the usefulness of desegregation
remedies in the metropolitanNorth. Moreover, Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins
have indicated the Court's desire to expedite the conclusion of court-ordered
desegregation altogether. 7
But Orfield's conclusionthatthe Court has "quietly reversed" Brown and,
therefore, his comparison of recent events to the period of southern Redemp-
tion are based on an unrealistic reading of Brown and its progeny. Orfield
understands Brown as requiring notjust the elimination of dejure segregation
and its effects, but the equalization of educational opportunities. He defines
this guarantee not in formalistic terms but as having substantive content, such
that white and minority students have "genuinely equal" chances for academic
success. Consequently, he contends, federal courts should require formerly
segregated school districts to ensure that objective measures of academic
achievement are largely equal between white and minority students, so that
race is no longer so strongly correlated with academic success."
16. See infra text accompanying notes 156-79.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 195-221.
18. This conception of equal educational opportunity is substantially more expansivethan
the mere absence of formal barriers, or even the provision of equivalent educational inputs, such
as per pupil expenditures, quality of teachers, physical facilities, and the like. It is significantly
less egalitarian than the conception that each child's educational opportunity should operate
completely independent of all morally irrelevant factors, including socioeconomic status. See
David A. Strauss, The Illusory Distinction Between Equality of Opportunity and Equality of
Result, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 171, 172-76 (1992). It is based on the belief that a social
condition in which race has a strong predictive value in assessing a child's chances for educa-
tional attainment violates the principles of racial equality and racial justice, as those concepts
are best understood. As discussed infra, I wholly agree with Orfield's conception of equal
educational opportunity, but I am skeptical of courts' ability to move American society toward
that objective.
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Although this conception ofeducational equalitymaybe a laudable policy
goal, such an interpretation of Brown and its progeny is far broader than that
ever embraced by the Court, even at the height of school desegregation's
acceptance in the early 1970s. Nor is it realistic to have expected the federal
judiciary, with its limited institutional capacities, to have given itself the role
of enforcing such a guarantee. The disparities in educational experience
between white and minority children are the result of myriad social and eco-
nomicproblems, such as income and wealth disparities, residential segregation,
high rates ofjoblessness, crime and violence in predominantly minority com-
munities, lack of access to health care, and the persistence of racism. In arguing
that the Court has betrayed Brown's vision, Orfield exaggerates what Brown
required - or ever could have required - as a remedy for school segregation.
More fundamentally, as we look toward the future, there are reasons to
wonder whether the continuation of court-ordered desegregation is a helpful
strategy for expanding the educational opportunities of minority children.
First, as critics of the Court's recent decisions would readily acknowledge, the
objectives attainable through desegregation litigation are dramatically
underinclusive as a means for addressing racial disparities in public education.
The permissible goals for court-ordered desegregation plans are narrowly
circumscribed by existing constitutional doctrine, such that few initiatives
which are likely to be helpful educationally are legally permissible. Second,
desegregation litigation may foster an unhelpful and distorted conception of
the problem of racial inequalities in public education. In particular, court-
ordered desegregation may facilitate the belief that governmental efforts to
improve educational opportunities for minority children should be compensa-
tory in nature- a narrowly tailored remedy redressing a discrete wrong-rather
than addressing the larger but more pertinent issue of systemic disadvantage. 9
Finally, focusing on litigation may divert attention and resources from efforts
to initiate change through the political process. Political initiatives generally
are not constrained by the narrow dictates that restrictjudicial remedies,2 and
19. By "systemic disadvantage," I mean the social condition in which aspecific character-
istic, such as race, correlates with disadvantage in a number of important aspects of well-being,
such as income, wealth, housing, health care, political influence, and treatment by the criminal
justice system. In the context of public education, it refers more specifically to those social and
economic disadvantages that, directly and indirectly, operate to deprive the average minority
student of an education similar in quality to that provided to the average white student and that
deny minority students an equal opportunity to achieve academic success. My conception of
systemic disadvantage derives largely from Cass R. Sunstein, TheAnticaste Principle, 92 MICH.
L.REV. 2410(1994). Sunstein defines the term as a disadvantage "that operates along standard
and predictable lines in multiple and important spheres of life and that applies in realms that
relate to basic participation as a citizen in a democracy." Id. at 2429.
20. An important exception isthatjudicially ordered race-conscious state action is clearly
permissible as a remedy for dejure segregation in the context of litigation, whereas, under the
HeinOnline  -- 56 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 173 1999
56 WASH. & LEE L. REV 169 (1999)
they provide the only means for addressing the broader social problems that
are the underlying causes of racial inequalities in education. Moreover, the
mobilization of citizens for political action can produce a range of collateral
benefits unavailable through litigation.
The point is not that continuing court-ordered desegregation is necessar-
ily misguided or that courts are incapable of playing a constructive role in
addressing these inequalities. But in advocating the continuation and exten-
sion of court-ordered desegregation, Orfield overlooks two important points.
First, the continuation of desegregation litigation may have unintended,
adverse consequences. Second, because ofthese possible effects, the question
of whether continuing such litigation is a sound strategy for expanding the
educational opportunities of minority children is a complicated empirical
inquiry. The answer depends on, among other things, the educational benefits
obtainable through judicial remedies in any particular case, the degree to
which continuing such litigation decreases the likelihood ofpolitical mobiliza-
tion, whether litigation can be used as leverage to produce political action, and
the likelihood of success for redistributive political initiatives more generally.
Ultimately, Orfield may be correct that court-ordered desegregation presently
offers the best means to address the persistent racial inequalities in American
education. But the issue is more complex and is plagued by more empirical
uncertainties than proponents such as Orfield concede.
Part I of this review essay briefly traces the evolution of desegregation
law from the Court's 1968 decision in Green v. County SchoolBoard,21 which
established the remedial framework for desegregation cases that remains
largely in place today, to the present.' Part II explains the essential elements
of Orfield's argument in Dismantling Desegregation, namely that (a) the
Burger and Rehnquist Court's desegregation decisions have effectively over-
ruled Brown, (b) this is especially troublesome in light of school desegrega-
tion's success as an educational policy, and (c) contrary to the Court's hold-
ings, judicially enforced desegregation remedies should continue until the
educational opportunities for white and minority children are genuinely equal.
In Part III, I assess Orfield's argument on its own terms. Although Disman-
tling Desegregation offers several important insights into the present debate
about school desegregation, its assertion that the Supreme Court has "quietly
reversed" Brown is exaggerated. This contention is based on a conception of
Supreme Court's recent affirmative action and redistricting decisions, race-conscious programs
adopted through the political process violate the Equal Protection Clause unless they are
narrowly tailored to furthering a compelling governmental interest. See infra text accompanying
notes 338-50.
21. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
22. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 433 (1968) (describing creation of
general standard for desegregation cases).
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court-ordered desegregation remedies that is much broaderthan ever embraced
by the Court and is inconsistent with the limited institutional competence of
the judiciary. Finally, Part IV raises more fundamental questions about the
future of court-ordered desegregation. Regardless of the impact ofjudicially
enforced school desegregation over the past forty years, there are reasons to
question whether the continuation of such litigation will produce meaningful
benefits for minority children in the future. Indeed, it is worth considering
whether continuing to pursue desegregation through the courts might, in the
long run, actually frustrate efforts to achieve meaningful social change.
L The Evolution of Court-Enforced Desegregation
The Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education'3 was the high water mark for judicial endorsement of
school desegregation in the United States. At issue in Swann was a plan to
desegregate the school district that encompasses Charlotte, North Carolina,
and its surrounding suburbs.24 The school district as a whole was 21% Af-
rican American and 79% white, but two-thirds of the African American
students were clustered in the cityY Because assigning students to neighbor-
hood schools would have left the district's schools racially imbalanced, 6 the
district court required the creation of gerrymandered and noncontiguous
attendance zones, accompanied by the busing of students between city and
suburban neighborhoods.27 The school district appealed, contending thatthese
remedies were beyond the scope of the constitutional violation.
The Court in Swann upheld the district court's remedy, stating that the
crucial question in assessing the constitutionality of a desegregation plan was
its "effectiveness."2 This cemented the Court's commitmentto a "corrective,"
as opposed to "prohibitory," approach to desegregation remedies,29 which it
had initially articulated three years earlier in Green v. County SchoolBoard.0
In Green, a Virginia county school board had attempted to comply with Brown
by adopting a "freedom of choice" plan, which permitted students to choose
23. 402U.S. 1(1971).
24. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 6 (1971).
25. Id at 6-7.
26. A school is racially imbalanced if its racial composition diverges significantly from
the racial composition of the school district as a whole. For example, some of the city schools
in Charlotte would have been predominantly black, even though the school district as a whole
was only 21% African American in composition.
27. Swann, 402 U.S. at 9-11.
28. Id. at 25.
29. See Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: SchoolDesegregation andthe Corrective
Ideal, 86 COLum. L. REv. 728, 738-54 (1986).
30. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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either of the school district's two schools.3" Unsurprisingly, few blacks chose
to attend the formerly all-white school, and no whites attended the all-black
school.32 The Court in Green held that the "freedom of choice" plan, although
facially neutral and free from discriminatory intent, was insufficient to dis-
charge the school district's constitutional obligations.3 According to the
Court, the school board's abandonment of a policy of deliberate segregation
was merely a first step to complying with the requirements of Brown.34
Formerly segregated school districts were also charged "with the affirmative
duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system
in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch. '35
In upholding the district court's remedy of busing and gerrymandered
attendance zones in Swann, the Court reaffirmed Green's corrective approach
to desegregation remedies.36 Once a school district had been found liable for
dejure segregation, it was obligated to take whatever steps necessary - even
if "administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre" - to eliminate
any ongoing effects, so-called "vestiges," ofpast discrimination.37 Moreover,
Swann confirmed that any ongoing segregation (or other discriminatory
"effect"38 ) that persisted in a formerly segregated school district was presump-
tively a vestige of past discrimination, which the school district was therefore
obligated to eradicate.39 Thus, if a school district such as Charlotte-Meck-
lenburg (a) was presently de facto segregated, (b) had been dejure segregated
in the past (as all school districts in the South had been), and (c) had not yet
been found by a court to have discharged its obligations under Brown (that is,
achieved "unitary status"4"), then the school district was presumptively obli-
31. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 433 (1968).
32. Id, at 441.
33. Id
34. Id. at 437.
35. Id. at 437-38.
36. See Gewirtz, supra note 29, at 738-39.
37. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971).
38. For instance, in some cases courts have found that the school district's constitutional
violation caused a system-wide reduction in student achievement. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 639
F. Supp. 19,24 (W.D. Mo. 1985), affidas modified, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 816 (1987). In these cases, this reduction in student achievement is presumptively
related to the dejure violation until the school district achieves unitary status. See Jenkins v.
Missouri, 122 F.3d 588, 593-95 (8th Cir. 1997).
39. SeeSwann,402U.S. at26 ("Thecourtshouldscrutinize [racially imbalanced] schools,
and the burden upon the school authorities will be to satisfy the court that their racial composi-
tion is not the result of present or past discriminatory action on their part.").
40. "Unitary status" refers to the point at which a formerly segregated school district has
eliminated all vestiges of the de jure system. The term originated in Green v. County School
Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968), in which the Court stated that formerly segregated systems were
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gated to eliminate its present de facto segregation. A school district could
relieve itself of this obligation only if it could disprove any causal connection
between the existing de facto segregation and the school district's original
constitutional violation. Unsurprisingly, it has been largely impossible for
school districts to establish this negative.4 Thus, Green and Swann created
an expansive framework for desegregation remedies; if plaintiffs could estab-
lish a dejure violation, the school district was practically required to integrate
completely all facets of its operations, regardless of the administrative burdens
or costs.
Within three years, however, the momentum favoring thoroughgoing
school desegregation had waned considerably. In 1974, the Court's decision
in Milliken Isubstantially undermined the usefulness of school desegregation
in northern metropolitan areas. In Milliken I, the district court had found the
Detroit school board and the State of Michigan liable for the dejure segrega-
tion of students within the Detroit school system.42 But the district court faced
a dilemma in crafting a remedy: Roughly 64% of the students in the Detroit
system were African American, and testimony at trial convincingly showed
that, under a Detroit-only plan, that proportion would rise to almost 90%
because of "white flight" shortly after implementation. 43 Heeding the com-
mand of Green and Swann that desegregation plans must "make every effort
to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation,"' the district
court required the participation of 53 predominantly white suburban school
districts that surrounded Detroit, busing students between city neighborhoods
and the suburbs.45
The Supreme Court held that the district court's metropolitan-wide
remedy was impermissible. The Court started with the premise that the scope
of a desegregation plan must be defined, and therefore circumscribed, by the
scope of the relevant constitutional violation.46 The Court also reasoned that
"the notion that school district lines may be casually ignored or treated as a
mere administrative convenience is contrary to the history of public education
in our country., 47 The integrity of these boundaries was essential to preserv-
obligated to come forward with "desegregation program[s] to effectuate conversion of a state-
imposed dual system to a unitary, nonracial system." Id. at 440-41.
41. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 503 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that
when school authorities must establish a negative, "plaintiffs will almost always win").
42. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 727 (1974) [hereinafter Milliken 1].
43. Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 586 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd, 484 F.2d 215
(6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
44. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971).
45. Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 733-34.
46. Id. at 744.
47. Id. at 741.
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ing local control of elementary and secondary public education, a "deeply
rooted" national tradition that the Court deemed "essential both to the mainte-
nance of community concern and support for public schools and to quality of
the educational process."4 The Court therefore concluded that dejure segre-
gation confined to a single school district could not justify a remedy that im-
posed obligations on other districts without "interdistrict segregation directly
caused by the constitutional violation."49 In Milliken, the district court had not
found that the suburban school districts had intentionally discriminated or that
the state had drawn its school district boundaries in a manner that fostered
interdistrict segregation; the relevant constitutional violation had only caused
segregation within Detroit schools.5" Accordingly, the remedy could only seek
to alleviate racial imbalances within the city school district.
The Milliken case returned to the Supreme Court three years later (Milli-
ken II), whereupon the Court approved a remedy that could substitute for the
actual integration of city and suburban students.51 On remand from Milliken I,
the district court had approved a modified desegregation plan that included
several "educational components," such as programs for remedial education,
career guidance and counseling, and co-curricular activities.52 The district
court had found these programs necessary to eliminate the lingering effects of
dejure segregation, even though the relevant constitutional violation had only
involved pupil assignments.53 The Supreme Court upheld the district court's
order, holding that "matters other than pupil assignment must on occasion be
addressed by federal courts to eliminate the effects of prior segregation." 4
The Court reasoned that discriminatory student assignments can "manifest and
breed other inequalities built into a dual system founded on racial discrimina-
tion."55 That is, "[c]hildren who have been.., educationally and culturally
set apart from the larger community will inevitably acquire habits of speech,
conduct, and attitudes reflecting their cultural isolation."5 Thus, compensa-
tory programs designed to remedy educational deficits traceable to past de
jure segregation can be "appropriate remedies to treat the condition that
offends the Constitution.,
57
48. Id. at 741-42.
49. Id. at 745.
50. Id.
51. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) [hereinafter Milliken I1].
52. Bradley v. Milliken, 402 F. Supp. 1096, 1118 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd, 540 F.2d 229 (6th
Cir. 1976), aff'd, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
53. Id.
54. Milliken 11, 433 U.S. at 283.
55. Id
56. Id. at 287.
57. Id. at286 n.17.
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Milliken II created a politically attractive alternative to mandatory inte-
gration as a remedy for past discrimination. In circumstances like Detroit's,
where the school district was predominantly minority, courts could provide
inner-city students with a legal remedy for dejure segregation without provok-
ing strident resistance from the suburbs. And so long as the state government
wasjointly responsible for the constitutional violations, the district court could
require the state to provide most of the funding for the compensatory pro-
grams. This ensured both that the remedies would have sufficient funding and
that the city school system - the entity charged with implementation - would
actively support the remedy and become an advocate for its continuation."
Aside from two rather insignificant 1979 decisions,59 the Court did not
decide another school desegregation case until 1991. In Board of Education
v. Dowell,' the Rehnquist Court's first desegregation decision, the Court held
that once a formerly segregated school district has achieved unitary status, it
has completely fulfilled its constitutional obligations and may act as if it had
never been found liable for de jure segregation.61 A unitary school system
could therefore abandon its desegregation plan, even if doing so would
resegregate its schools.62 Thus, the school district in Dowell (Oklahoma City)
could assign its elementary school students to neighborhood schools even
though doing so resulted in 33 of the district's 64 elementary schools having
student populations that were at least 90% one-race.63
A year later, the Rehnquist Court handed down its second primary school
desegregation decision. In Freeman v. Pitts," the district court had found that
the school system had achieved "partially unitary status," meaning that the
school system had eliminated the vestiges of discrimination from some, but
not all, aspects of its operations.65 Accordingly, the court returned the unitary
aspects of the system (student assignments, transportation, physical facilities,
and extracurricular activities) to the control of local officials while retaining
58. For instance, in Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995), the school district, though
a nominal defendant, remained a "friendly adversary" of the plaintiffs throughout the litigation.
See id. at 79.
59. Those cases were Dayton Board ofEducation v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979), and
Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
60. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
61. Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991).
62. See Bradley W. Joondeph, Note, Killing Brown Softly: The Subtle Undermining of
Effective Desegregation in Freeman v. Pitts, 46 STAN. L. REV. 147, 164 (1993) (discussing
unitary school systems' freedom to implement policies that exacerbate existing racial imbal-
ances).
63. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 242.
64. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
65. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 474 (1992).
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supervision over the remaining areas (teacher and principal assignments, and
quality of education).66 The Supreme Court upheld the district court's piece-
meal withdrawal ofjudicial supervision, emphasizing that "[rleturning schools
to the control of local authorities at the earliest practicable date is essential to
restore their true accountability in our governmental system. ' 6 The Court
stated that judicial supervision was always "intended as a 'temporary mea-
sure,"' and that "[a]lthough this temporary measure has lasted decades, the
ultimate objective has not changed - to return school districts to the control
of local authorities."68 A district court's partial withdrawal of supervision
over a formerly segregated school district "can be an important and significant
step in fulfilling the district court's duty to return the operations and control
of schools to local authorities."69
Most recently, the Court in Missouri v. Jenkins7" essentially ended the
vast compensatory education programs designed to remedy the effects of past
discrimination in Kansas City's schools.7 ' As in Milliken II, the district court
had found that de jure segregation in the Kansas City, Missouri, School
District (KCMSD) had caused "a system wide reduction in student achieve-
ment."'72 The district court also found that the constitutional violations had
caused white families to leave the school district, leaving the KCMSD more
racially isolated than it would have been had the school district and the State
of Missouri not engaged in racial discrimination.' The district court therefore
ordered a wide range of compensatory educational programs for the KCMSD
with the dual goals of improving the quality of education and luring more
white students to enroll voluntarily in the district.74 One such compensatory
program mandated funding for increased teacher salaries intended to raise
compensation to a level commensurate with surrounding school districts.75
66. Id at 484.
67. Id at 490.
68. Id at 489 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247 (1991)).
69. Id.
70. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
71. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 100 (1995).
72. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19,24 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (emphasis omitted), aff'd
as modified, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986).
73. See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 161 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing district court finding that
attributed white flight from district to past constitutional violations).
74. See Joondeph, supra note 8, at 620-22 (discussing court-ordered compensatory
measures including hiring more librarians, reducing teaching loads, hiring guidance counselors,
reducing class size, and implementing summer school and tutoring programs).
75. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400, 410 (W.D. Mo. 1987) (ordering school
district to use $7.1 million per fiscal year to fund teacher salary increases), aft'd in part and
rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1034 (1989).
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In 1994, the State of Missouri, which had funded roughly three-fourths
of the $1.5 billion in compensatory programs for the KCMSD,76 challenged
the continuation of teacher salary increases and moved for a finding of par-
tially unitary status." The district court rejected the State's objections and
ordered the continuation of salary relief." Although the court did not explic-
itly address the State's unitary status claim, it implicitly concluded that the
school district had not yet achieved partially unitary status. 9 The court
reached this decision at least partly because the standardized test scores of
KCMSD students remained well below national averages.80
The Supreme Court reversed the district court on both grounds."1 First,
the Court held that because the district court had justified the salary relief
order in part because it would attract more white students into the district, the
order was an impermissible interdistrict remedy underMilliken .2 The Court
reasoned that, in seeking to enhance the KCMSD's "desegregative attractive-
ness," the district court had designed the order to have interdistrict effects. 3
This remedy exceeded the scope of the relevant constitutional violation
because it amounted to an interdistrict response to a purely intradistrict viola-
tion." "In effect, the District Court has devised a remedy to accomplish
indirectly what it admittedly lacks the remedial authority to mandate directly:
the interdistrict transfer of students."8 5 The Court also held that the district
76. Exactly how much money has been spent on theKCMSD as part of the desegregation
remedy is unclear. Estimates vary from $1.2 billion to $1.7 billion. See Dennis Famey, Fading
Dream? Integration Is Faltering in Kansas City Schools as Priorities Change, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 26, 1995, at Al ($1.2 billion); Linda Greenhouse, Justices Say Making State Pay in
Desegregation Case Was Error, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1995, at Al ($1.5 billion); James S.
Kunen, The End of Integration: A Four-Decade Effort Is Being Abandoned, as Exhausted
Courts and Frustrated Blacks Dust Off the Concept of"Separate but Equal," TIME, Apr. 29,
1996, at 39, 41 ($1.7 billion).
77. See Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4, 1992 WL 551568, at * 1 (W.D. Mo.
June 25, 1992) (summarizing opposition to salary relief order), aff'd, I1 F.3d 755 (8th Cir.
1993), rev'd, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Jenkins v. Missouri, 11 F.3d 755, 760 (8th Cir. 1993)
(discussing motion for partial unitary status), rev'd, 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
78. Jenkins, 1992 WL 551568, at *8-*9.
79. See Jenkins, I 1 F.3d at 760-61 (commenting, without discussion, on rejection of
State's argument in June 17, 1992 order).
80. See id at 761-62 (restating district court's finding that test scores in district still
lagged behind national norms, although school district had made substantial improvement in
academic achievement).
81. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 100 (1995).
82. Id. at 94.
83. Id. at 91-92.
84. See id. at 92.
85. Id
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court's comparison of KCMSD students' standardized test scores to national
norms was inappropriate in deciding whether the school district had achieved
partially unitary status.86 The Court stated that student achievement is the
result of many factors, several of which are "beyond the control of the
KCMSD and the State.""7 It reasoned that if"these external factors are not the
result of segregation, they do not figure in the remedial calculus."88
II. The Dismantling of Court-Ordered Desegregation
In Dismantling Desegregation, Orfield harshly condemns the Supreme
Court's desegregation jurisprudence. In his view, Milliken I, as well as the
Rehnquist Court's three recent desegregation decisions, has ignored the
fundamental lessons of Brown-that racially separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal and that states must provide the same educational opportu-
nities to minority children that they provide to whites.8 9 The Court's recent
decisions have not only blessed a return to segregated schools, but they have
done so without any regard for whether the schools have truly equalized
educational opportunities for white and black students." The decisions have
made "desegregation orders short-lived and ineffectual, and [have] legiti-
mate[d] sending minority students back to inferior schools after a few years
without any showing that the harmful effects were cured."9" Orfield contends
that this return to segregation is reminiscent of the period in American history
in which the Court formally endorsed the principle of "separate but equal."'
Much as the federal government abandoned its protection of newly freed
slaves following the Civil War, and the Supreme Court gutted the guarantees
of the Reconstruction Amendments and the Reconstruction-era civil rights
legislation, federal courts presently are abdicating their responsibility under
Brown to guarantee racial equality in public education.93 As Dismantling
Desegregation's subtitle asserts, this exaltation of the principles of federalism
and local autonomy over the command of racial equality has amounted to
nothing short of a "quiet reversal" of Brown.
The starting point forDismantlingDesegregation's analysis is Milliken ,
which Orfield contends was a "turning point" in the history of school desegre-
86. See id at 101.
87. Id at 102.
88. Id
89. See ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 1.
90. See id. at 75-76.
91. Id. at 50.
92. See id at 30.
93. See id at 34.
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gation.' Accordingto Orfield, Millikenl"renderedBrown almost meaningless
for most of the metropolitan North."'95 By prohibiting desegregation between
city and suburban school districts, except in the rare instances in which plain-
tiffs could demonstrate significant interdistrict segregative effects," Milliken
I "guaranteed that desegregation would be limited and temporary in much of
the North,"'9 and that "there would be no remedy for unconstitutional segrega-
tion in much of metropolitan America."9" Even if plaintiffs in city school
systems could demonstrate that their school districts had engaged in unlawful
discrimination, "poor minority children would be confined to segregated
central city schools as the remaining whites and, later, many middle-class
minority families fled to suburbs."" And as the dissenting Justices in Milliken
Ihad predicted, "Detroit and other cities like it... bec[a]me even more segre-
gated by both race and economic class once they tried to desegregate inside a
black city."' Orfield thus concludes that Milliken I "lock[ed] millions of
minority schoolchildren into inferior, isolated schools."'0 '
Much as Milliken Iforeclosed the possibility of effective desegregation
in most northern metropolitan areas, Orfield contends that the Rehnquist
Court's trilogy of desegregation decisions has ended the chance for successful
desegregation in the rest of the country. 2 Orfield terms Dowell, Freeman,
94. See id at 10.
95. Id. at2.
96. Courts have ordered interdistrict desegregation remedies based on afmdingofsignifi-
cant interdistrict segregative effects for only the following four school systems: Indianapolis,
Little Rock, Louisville, and Wilmington. SeegenerallyLittle Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County
Special Sch. Dist., 778 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1985) (Little Rock, Arkansas), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1186 (1986); United States v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.) (Indianapolis,
Indiana), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980); Newburg AreaCouncil v. Board ofEduc., 510 F.2d
1358 (6th Cir. 1974) (Louisville, Kentucky), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975); Evans v.
Buchanan, 447 F. Supp. 982 (D. Del.) (Wilmington, Delaware), affid, 582 F.2d 750 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 923 (1980). In addition, federal courts have approved settlement
agreements in St. Louis and Milwaukee involving voluntary interdistrict student transfer
programs. See Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 816 (1984);
Armstrong v. Board of Sch. Dirs., 471 F. Supp. 800, 815, 819-20 (E.D. Wis. 1979), aft'd, 616
F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980); see also D. Bruce La Pierre, VoluntarylnterdistrictSchoolDesegre-
gation in St. Louis: The Special Master's Tale, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 971, 975-82.
97. ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 11.
98. Id at 30.
99. Id.
100. Id
101. Id. at 13.
102. See id at 2-3 (interpreting Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins as abandoning "the goal of
rooting out the lingering damage of racial segregation and discrimination" to pursue "the twin
goals of minimizing judicial involvement in education and restoring power to local and state
governments, whatever the consequences").
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and Jenkins "the resegregation decisions""03 because, not only have they
signaled the abandonment of court-ordered desegregation, but they have also
facilitated and even encouraged the resegregation of formerly segregated
school districts. The Court's understanding of "unitary status" no longer
envisions a "school system with equitable interracial schools," but instead
represents "merely a method of getting out of racial integration."14
For instance, the Court's holding in Dowell dictates that, after having
achieved unitary status, a formerly segregated school district is no longer
obligated to take affirmative steps to assure racial balance in the school
system;' 5 the only constraint on a district's adoption of new policies is that
they not have been motivated by intentional discrimination."° Once declared
unitary, formerly segregated school districts are free to adopt race-neutral
policies that aggravate racial imbalances. 7 Orfield sees this as sinister, as it
permits school systems with a long history of racial prejudice to "knowingly
re-create segregated schools with impunity."'08 By closing its eyes to segrega-
tion that occurs after the conclusion of judicial supervision, the Rehnquist
Courthas ignoredBrown's commandthat "[s]eparate educational facilities are
inherently unequal,"'" allowing school systems that have formally obeyed
their desegregation plans to "send students back to neighborhood schools,
even if those schools [are] segregated and inferior."'10
Most important, contends Orfield, the Court's decisions have permitted
formerly segregated school districts to abandon their desegregation plans even
when educational outcomes for black and white students remain substantially
unequal."' If Brown stated that separate schools were "inherently unequal,"
then "one might expect that a finding that desegregation requirements have
been fulfilled would require proof of equality.""' 2 That is, "it would be
103. See, e.g., id. at 28.
104. Id. at 19.
105. See Joondeph, supra note 62, at 163-64.
106. Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991).
A school district which has been released from an injunction imposing adesegrega-
tion plan no longerrequires court authorization for the promulgation ofpolicies and
rules regulating matters such as assignment of students and the like, but it of course
remains subject to the mandate of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Id
107. See Joondeph, supra note 62, at 163-64.
108. ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 19.
109. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) [hereinafter Brown 1].
110. ORFmLD ET AL., supra note 2, at 2.
111. Id.
112. Id. at75.
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reasonable to expect that education for minority students had become more
equal to that of white students in the metropolitan area in terms of achieve-
ment test scores, graduation, college preparation, and other educational meas-
ures.""' 3 But Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins make clear that formerly segre-
gated school districts are entitled to a finding of unitary status once they have
eliminated those conditions proximately traceable to past discrimination,
regardless of ongoing disparities in educational achievement."' Unless con-
tinuing racial inequality in test scores, graduation rates, or other measures of
achievement are proximately traceable to the district's constitutional violation,
attempting to ameliorate these disparities is beyond the scope of an appropri-
ately tailored remedy."5 In short, "school districts do not need to show that
education gains or opportunities are equal between minority and white chil-
dren." 16
Orfield contends that this abandonment of desegregation by the federal
courts parallels the events that followed the collapse of Radical Reconstruc-
tion, including the Supreme Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson."7 "[W]e
are moving back toward a rigid form of the tradition of separate and unequal
education" in a manner similar to "the period in which the dream of abolition-
ists and the goals of the Civil War gave way to the reality of apartheid in the
United States.""' In 1877, as part ofan intricate compromise that resolved the
disputed 1876 presidential election in favor of Rutherford B. Hayes, northern
Republicans agreed to abolish the Freedman's Bureau and to withdraw all
remaining federal troops from the unredeemed southern states. " This marked
the formal collapse of Radical Reconstruction and the completion of southern
Redemption.' The federal government abandoned the role it had assumed
during Reconstruction of protecting African Americans from discrimination
in the states of the former Confederacy, instead pursuing a policy of regional
reconciliation that would facilitate economic growth in both the North and
113. Id.
114. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 101 (1995); Freemanv. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,485
(1992); Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-50 (1991).
115. See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 496 ("The vestiges of segregation that are the concern of
the law in a school case may be subtle and intangible but nonetheless they must be so real that
they have a causal link to the dejure violation being remedied.").
116. ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 20.
117. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
118. ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 26.
119. See RICHARDKLUGER, SIMPLEJUSTICE: THEHISTORYOFBROwNV.BOARDOFEDUCA-
TION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 61-62 (1976); C. VANN WOODWARD,
REUNION AND REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF 1877 AND THE END OF RECONSTRUCTION 186-
215 (1951).
120. See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION: AFrERTHE CIVIL WAR 218 (1961).
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South.' While the transformation was not immediate,'2 southern states
under pure "home rule" relegated blacks to a legally-enforced second-class
status in, among others, the following ways: laws respecting vagrancy, petty
theft, contract enforcement, and false pretenses, combined with criminal
surety laws and the practices of convict labor and convict lease, coerced many
blacks into labor in a manner similar to slavery;" state-imposed segregation
statutes mandated separate facilities for African Americans in virtually every
sphere of public life; and legal devices, such as poll taxes, literacy tests,
white primaries, and grandfather clauses, as well as extralegal, though tacitly
approved, violence and intimidation, completely excluded blacks from partici-
pation in the political process." By the early 1900s, southern states had
uniformly imposed a rigid racial caste system, essentially rendering the
guarantees of the Reconstruction Amendments a dead letter.'26
As students of constitutional history know well, the Supreme Court was
an important accomplice to the subjugation of African Americans during this
period. 27 In a series of decisions, the Court eviscerated the protections of the
Reconstruction Amendments and the civil rights legislation enacted thereun-
der.12 1 The Court's decision in The Slaughter-House Cases.. largely gutted
121. See id. at 218-27; WOODWARD, supra note 119, at 3-4; Michael W. McConnell, The
Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 115, 130 (1994).
122. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREEROF JIM CROW 31-65 (3d ed. 1974)
(describing "unstable interlude" between end of Reconstruction and beginning of universal
system of rigid segregation).
123. See Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 881, 922, 927-30 (1998).
124. See WOODWARD, supra note 122, at 67-109 (describing rise of segregation in South,
as extending to separate Bibles for African American witnesses in court and separate elevators
in office buildings); Klarman, supra note 123, at 889-90, 911-12.
125. See JOHNHOPEFRANKLIN, FROMSLAVERYTOFREEDOM: AHIsTORYOFNEGROAMER-
ICANS 332-43 (3d ed. 1967) (discussing wide range of methods that southern states used to
deprive African Americans oftheirrightto vote); J. MORGANKOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTH-
ERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH,
1880-1910 (1974); WOODWARD,supra note 122, at 83-86; Klarman, supra note 123, at 889, 910.
126. See GUNNARMYRDAL,ANAMERICANDLEMMA 667-88 (2d ed. 1962); WOODWARD,
supra note 122, at 67-109; McConnell, supra note 121, at 132.
127. See J. HARVrE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWNTO BAK.KE 11-23 (1979) (documenting
Court's series of late nineteenth century decisions involving race and describing them as consti-
tuting "one oflustice's dark hours"); WOODWARD, supra note 122, at 70-71; McConnell, supra
note 121, at 133-40.
128. See KLUGER, supra note 119, at 83 ("By the close of the nineteenth century,. . . the
Supreme Court had nullified nearly every vestige of the federal protection that had been cast like
a comforting cloak over the Negro upon his release from bondage."); McConnell, supra note
121, at 140 (noting that Plessy "marked the effective repeal of the Fourteenth Amendment").
129. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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the Privileges and Immunities Clause, construing itto protect only those rights
incident to national citizenship, such as the right to travel. 3 The Court held
that the clause offered no protection for the more important rights arising
under state law, such as the right to property, to contract, to security of the
person, or to essential guarantees in the criminal process."' In The Civil
Rights Cases,'32 the Court struck down the public accommodations sections
of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, a central legislative achievement of Recon-
struction, on the ground that Congress lacked the power under the Thirteenth
or Fourteenth Amendments to prohibit private discrimination.' And in the
notorious 1896 Plessy decision, the Court expressly condoned the growing
practice of state-mandated racial segregation, though such mandatory racial
separation "went beyond what even die-hard southern Democrats had been
able to defend in 1875.' 134
Orfield argues that, in their recent desegregation decisions, the federal
courts have similarly abdicated their responsibility to protect African Ameri-
cans in communities with a long history of racial discrimination. As during
Redemption, the Supreme Court has sacrificed the principle of racial equality
on the altar of state and local sovereignty:
Both the 1896 Plessy decision andthe 1990s' resegregation cases entrusted
minority rights to local and state politics in the face of profound social and
economic inequalities andracially polarized politics. After Reconstruction,
courts affirmed state power even in the face of manifest plans to limit black
opportunities. In the 1990s, powerwas turned back to local school districts
130. The Slaughter-HouseCases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36(1873); see DAVIDA.J.RicHARDS,
CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION: HISTORY, THEORY, AND THE LAW OF THE RECONSTRUC-
TION AMENDMENTS 204-32(1993); GEOFFREYR. STONEETAL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 508-09
(3d ed. 1996); LAURENCEH. TRIBE, AMERICANCONSTIrUTIONALLAW §§ 7-2 to 7-4, at 550-59
(2d ed. 1988).
131. See McConnell, supra note 121, at 133-34.
132. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
133. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3(1883); see STONEETAL., supranote 130, at510-
11; McConnell, supra note 121, at 133.
134. McConnell, supra note 121, at 139. Other important Redemption-era decisions that
eviscerated the promise of the Reconstruction amendments and legislation were United States
v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875), which struck down provisions of the 1870 Enforcement Act as
beyond Congress's power under the Fifteenth Amendment; United States v. Cruikshank 92
U.S. 542 (1875), which overturned convictions under the same Act for three defendants'
participation in the lynching of at least 60 African Americans in Grant Parish, Louisiana,
because the Fourteenth Amendment did not give Congress the power to regulate purely private
conduct; UnitedStates v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882), which struck down on the same grounds
convictions under the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 for members of a lynch mob who had seized
prisoners held by a state official; and Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898), which
upheld state practices that vested virtually unreviewable discretion in local officials to determine
the qualification of individual voters.
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in spite of the fact that almost every city and many states had strongly
resisted desegregation and many were actively planning to resegregate.'35
In the same vein, Orfield characterizes the Court's recent desegregation
decisions as creating a "new era of 'separate but equal."" 3 The Rehnquist
Court has not simply curtailed the availability or extensiveness of desegrega-
tion remedies but has actually "reversed" Brown.'37 InDowell, Freeman, and
Jenkins, the "Court has, once again, authorized lower courts to send minority
childrento segregated schools."'38 Indeed, the Rehnquist Court has "exhumed
some of Plessy's basic assumptions ... , authoriz[ing] lower courts to send
minority children to segregated schools without any assurance that the schools
will be genuinely equal."' 39 They have moved the country back toward "a
rigid form of the tradition of separate and unequal education."' 40
Orfield finds the Court's dismantling of Brown especially troubling
because of school desegregation's remarkable success as an educational policy
over the last forty years. The Rehnquist Court's decisions reflect a broader
societal skepticism, wholly independent of its legal foundations, about the
practical benefits of desegregation. For instance, in July 1997, the NAACP,
the organization that spawned the Legal Defense and Education Fund that
originally litigated Brown, debated whether school desegregation should
remain one of its official objectives.' 4 ' Many scholars have recently ques-
tioned the value of desegregation, and some have insinuated that it has been
counterproductive. Notably, this skepticism has become increasingly
135. ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 34.
136. Id. at 24; see id. at 26 (suggesting that "we are moving back toward a rigid form of
the tradition of separate and unequal education").
137. Indeed, the book's provocative subtitle is The Quiet Reversal ofBrown v. Board of
Education.
138. ORFIELD Er AL., supra note 2, at 29; see id. at 2 ("[P]ublic decisions that re-create
segregation, sometimes even more severe than before desegregation orders, are now deemed
acceptable."); id. at 24 ("[S]egregation has somehow come to be viewed as a type of school
reform, something progressive and new.").
139. Id. at27; see id at26 ("Thearguments made acentury ago whenPlessy made'separ-
ate but equal' the legal justification for segregation, and the assumptions of courts and political
leaders at that time, bear a resemblance to those heard in the school desegregation debates
today."); id. at 33 (stating that Rehnquist Court's desegregation decisions "echo some of
Plessy's basic themes and employ arguments paralleling some of those used to justify an end
to Reconstruction-era civil rights law").
140. Id at 26.
141. See Steven A. Holmes, N.A.A.C.P. Leader Is Silent on Desegregation, N.Y. TIME,
July 14, 1997, at A10.
142. See, e.g., DAVIDARMOR, FORCED JusTCE (1994); DERRICK BELL, AND WEARENOT
SAVED: THE ELusiVE QUEST FOR RAcIAL JusTIcE 107-22 (1987) (discussing viability of
desegregation strategies); Roy L. BROOKS, INTEGRATION OR SEPARATION? A STRATEGY FOR
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prominent among African Americans, desegregation's supposed principal
beneficiaries. 4 In many school districts that have operated under mandatory
desegregation plans, blacks have voiced a preference to return to neighbor-
hood schools.'"
Orfield laments these doubts, asserting that "integration's achievements
are considerable."'45 First, many studies of the impact of school desegregation
have focused myopically on short-term increases in standardized test scores."'46
Unsurprisingly, this research has tended to understate the actual effects of
desegregation on students. 47 Second, those studies that have taken a more
long-term view have found significant improvements in achievement for
minority students, particularly where desegregation began in early elementary
school and placed students in schools with peers of higher socioeconomic
status. 4 ' Finally, "considerable evidence support[s] the argument that deseg-
regation plugs students into a different network tied to greater lifelong oppor-
tunity,"'49 resulting in a greater likelihood of success in college, of working
in integrated employment settings, and of living in integrated neighborhoods
as adults. 0 "In contrast to the critics' assumptions, the theory is not one of
white racial superiority but a theory about the opportunity networks that
historic discrimination has attached to white middle-class schools and about
the advantages that come from breaking into those mobility networks."'
RACIAL EQUALITY (1997); Christine H. Rossell,AnAnalysis ofthe Court Decisions in Sheffv.
O'Neil and Possible Remedies for Racial Isolation, 29 CONN. L. REv. 1187(1997); Glenn C.
Loury, Integration Has Had Its Day, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1997, at A23.
143. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACIsM, AND AMERICAN LAW § 7.6.4 n.26 (3d ed.
1992) (reporting on 1981 Gallup poll finding that half of blacks found busing to have "caused
more difficulty than it is worth"); Freeman R. Bosley Jr., Schools Aren't Enough: Integrate
Neighborhoods, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 10, 1997, at 3B (African American mayor
calling for end to school desegregation in St. Louis); Dick Lilly, Seattle to EndBusing: Seattle
BoardDropsRace-BasedSystem, SEATTLETIMEs, Nov. 21,1996, atAl (reporting Seattlepublic
school district, led by African American superintendent John Stanford, was abandoning 30-year-
old voluntary desegregation plan). See generally Peter Applebome, A Wave of Suits Seeks
ReversalofSchoolBusing,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26,1995, atA6; Jerelyn Eddings, Second Thoughts
About Integration, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 28, 1997, at 32; Dennis Farney, Fading
Dream? Integration Is Faltering in Kansas CitySchools as Priorities Change, WALL ST. J., Sept.
26, 1995, at Al; James S. Kunen, The End ofIntegration, TIME, Apr. 29, 1996, at 39.
144. See Drew S. Days III, Brown Blues: Rethinking the Integrative Ideal, 34 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 53, 54 (1992); Douglas, The End of Busing?, supra note 2, at 1731.
145. See ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at xviii (with Susan Eaton).
146. See id. at 104-05.
147. See id. at 105.
148. See id.
149. Id. at 106.
150. See id. at xviii, 342.
151. Id. at 344.
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Because the educational opportunities available to white and minority
children in America's public schools remain largely unequal, and because
desegregation has proved efficacious in efihancing minority students' educa-
tional achievement and broader "life chances," Dismantling Desegregation
concludes that court-ordered desegregation remedies should continue and
expand. According to Orfield, our nation's experience proves that racial
isolation is incapable of producing meaningful equality: "Seven decades of
'separate but equal' under Plessy were probably the best documented social
policy experiment in American history," ' an experiment that proved that
segregated schools will never "be equal so long as the rest of society is
profoundly unequal."'5 Thus, contrary to the Supreme Court's recent deci-
sions, federal courts should require formerly de jure school districts to con-
tinue to implement desegregation remedies until the educational opportunities
provided to white and minority students are "genuinely equal," such that racial
disparities in test scores, graduation rates, and college attendance rates have
largely dissipated, 4 By permitting school districts to resegregate their
students, the federal judiciary risks "making permanent the highly unequal
structure of opportunity that confines millions of children to segregation and
inadequate schools in declining parts of metropolitan America." '
III Assessing the Dismantling
Dismantling Desegregation makes important points about the practical
effects of school desegregation and the Supreme Court's recent decisions.
Although some disagreement remains on the question, a wide body of empiri-
cal research supports Orfield's basic premise that school desegregation, at
least under certain circumstances, has produced substantial benefits for
minority children. And the Court's desegregation decisions over the past
twenty-five years, particularly Milliken I and the Rehnquist Court's trilogy,
have clearly created a more restrictive framework for permissible court-
ordered desegregation remedies. Nonetheless, Dismantling Desegregation's
ultimate doctrinal conclusion-that these decisions have effectively overruled
Brown - is greatly exaggerated. It is founded on an understanding of Brown
that is not only much broader than that ever embraced by the Court, but also
inconsistent with the limited institutional capacities of courts. Hence, the
assertions that the Court has dismantled Brown, and that recent events have
mirrored the period of southern Redemption, are based on a flawed conception
152. Id. at 50-51.
153. Id. at 361.
154. See id. at 20.
155. Id at 50.
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of what Brown requires, or ever realistically could have required, as a remedy
for school segregation.
This Part assesses the central elements of Orfield's argument. Sections
A and B concur with Orfield's contentions that school desegregation has been
successful as an educational policy and that Milliken I and the Rehnquist
Court's decisions have represented important turning points in the Court's
desegregation jurisprudence that have restricted the breadth of permissible
remedies. Section C, however, explains that Orfield's conclusions that the
Court has "quietly reversed" Brown, and that recent events in this area have
represented a second Redemption, are overstated.
A. The Instrumental Benefits of School Desegregation
Dismantling Desegregation's basic premise -that school desegregation
has produced tangible benefits for minority children - is well supported by
empirical research. The period of widespread school desegregation in the
United States, approximately from 1970 until 1990, corresponded with a
dramatic increase in the level of academic achievement for African Ameri-
cans relative to whites. 56 In 1971, the difference between white and black
thirteen-year-olds in average reading scores on the National Assessment of
Educational Progress (NAEP) was 39 points (on a scale from 0 to 500), but
by 1990 it had decreased to 18 points.'57 Similarly, the gap in math scores
between white and black seventeen-year-olds was 40 points in 1973, but had
fallen to 21 points by 1990.1 Though less pronounced, test scores in every
age group and for each subject tested demonstrated a similar pattern over
roughly the same time period.'59 Likewise, the gap between white and black
high school and college graduation rates closed dramatically. In 1970, the
high school dropout rate for African Americans was 43.9%, compared to
22.2% for whites." In 1988, the rate was 19.2% for African Americans and
13.4% for whites. 6' In 1970, whites were 2.36 times as likely as blacks to
graduate from college, whereas in 1988 they were only 1.91 times as likely."'
156. See CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE
UNDERCLASS 170-81 (1992); David J. Armor, Why IsBlackEducationalAchievementRising?,
108 PUB. INTEREST 65, 67-68 (1991); Larry V. Hedges &AmyNowell, Black-White Test Score
Convergence Since 1965, in THEBLACK-WHITETEST SCORE GAP 149,167 (Christopher Jencks
& Meredith Phillips eds., 1998).
157. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION,
NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS ix (1997).
158. See id
159. See id
160. See JENCKS, supra note 156, at 177 tbl. 5.7.
161. See id
162. See id
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Of course, this correlation does not prove causation, 63 but it does mean that
substantial progress occurred simultaneous to the implementation of desegre-
gation.
More specifically, those studies that have attempted to isolate the effects
of desegregation have generally found that, controlling for such relevant vari-
ables as the student's socioeconomic background and preexisting ability,
school desegregation produces a modest but statistically significant increase
in achievement for minority children with no detriment to white children.'"
The most comprehensive study of the subject, a meta-analysis conducted by
Rita Mahard and Robert Crain of 93 separate studies, concluded that "desegre-
gation has consistently positive effects for black students."'65 Mahard and
Crain divided the 93 studies into 323 samples of students and found that
"[s]lightly over half of the samples showed an increase in achievement after
desegregation, while the remainder were divided between samples that showed
no change and samples that lost ground,"'" and that those studies employing
the strongest methodology were more likely to show positive results.67 They
also found that "the age at which desegregation began made a very important
difference,""' such that virtually every study of students desegregated in
kindergarten or first grade showed significant positive effects.'69 Their best
estimate was that first grade desegregation would raise student achievement
by one-third of a standard deviation. 7' This constituted only a small differ-
ence in the first grade, but if a student "held on to this advantage throughout
163. See Armor, supra note 156, at69-80 (contending thatrise in black academic achieve-
ment is attributable to increase in African Americans' socioeconomic status and not to school
desegregation).
164. See, e.g., JANINEBEMPECHATFOSTERNGHIGHACHIEVEMENTINAFRICANAMRICAN
CHILDREN: HOME, SCHOOL, AND PUBLIC POLICY INFLUENCES 35-36, 43-44 (1992); JENCKS,
supra note 156, at 4, 9; Jomills Henry Braddock II & James M. McPartland, The Social and
Academic Consequences of School Desegregation, EQUITY & CHOICE, Feb. 1988, at 5, 6-7;
Christopher Jencks & Marsha Brown, The Effects ofDesegregation on Student Achievement:
Some New Evidencefrom the Equality of Educational Opportunity Survey, 48 SOC. EDUC. 126,
136-37 (1975); James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: "All-Out" School Desegregation
Explained, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1624-26 (1990); Rita E. Mahard & Robert L. Crain,
Research on Minority Achievement in Desegregated Schools, in THE CONSEQUENCES OF
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 103 (Christine H. Rossell & Willis D. Hawley eds., 1983); powell,
supra note 8, at 788-90. But see ARMOR, supra note 142, at 112 (contending that evidence
regarding impact of desegregation on academic achievement is inconclusive).
165. Mahard & Crain, supra note 164, at 111.
166. Id at 106.
167. Seeid. atlll.
168. Id at 109.
169. See id at 110-11.
170. See id. at lI 1.
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school.., he or she would be approximately one grade level higher than if he
or she had been in a segregated school."17'
The majority of researchers who have studied the question have sup-
ported Mahard and Crain's basic conclusions."7 Most recently, in an amici
brief filed in Freeman, 52 social scientists attested to the findings that "deseg-
regation is generally associated with moderate gains in the academic achieve-
ment of black children," and that these gains are "significant."'73 Others have
been more resolute than Mahard and Crain in their assessment of desegrega-
tion's benefits. For instance, James Liebman has written in his survey of the
literature that "[w]ithout doubt, desegregation improves black academic
achievement." 74
Empirical research has also demonstrated that desegregation improves
African American students' "life chances" according to avariety of indicators
of social well-being. Again holding constant the measurable relevant vari-
ables, school desegregation appears to reduce the rates of teenage pregnancy
and delinquent behavior for African American children and to increase the
likelihood that black students will attend college, attend a four-year college,
receive solid grades, and graduate from college.' African Americans who
attended desegregated schools also seem to have higher average salaries as
adults than do those who attended segregated schools.'76 School desegrega-
tion can also instigate greater integration in other spheres of social
interaction."7 Studies have shown that students who attend integrated primary
or secondary schools are more likely to attend desegregated colleges, to work
in integrated employment settings, to socialize with individuals of different
races, to live in integrated neighborhoods, and to have children who attend
171. Id.
172. See supra note 164.
173. BriefoftheNAACP, DeKalb County, Georgia, Branch oftheNAACP etal., asAmici
Curiae in Support of Respondents app. at 7a-8a, Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992) (No. 89-
1290). But cf Michael Heise, Assessing the Efficacy of School Desegregation, 46 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 1093, 1102 (1996) (noting that amid brief in Freeman constituted "a more tempered
endorsement ofscho ol desegregation" than social science community had embraced previously).
174. Liebman, supra note 164, at 1624.
175. See id. at 1625-26; see also Jomills Henry Braddock II & James M. McPartland,
AssessingSchoolDesegregation Effects: New Directions in Research, in RESEARCHIN SOCIOL-
OGYOF EDUCATIONAND SOCIALIZATION 259,272 (Alan C. Kerckhoff& Ronald G. Corwin eds.,
1982) (concluding that desegregation has positive effect on years of college attainment).
176. See Liebman, supra note 164, at 1626.
177. See Jomills Henry Braddock II, The Perpetuation of Segregation Across Levels of
Education: A Behavioral Assessment of the Contact Hypothesis, 53 SOC. EDUc. 178, 184-85
(1980); Braddock & McPartland, supra note 164, at 8; Amy Stuart Wells & Robert L. Crain,
Perpetuation Theory and the Long-Term Effects ofSchool Desegregation, 64 REv. EDUC. Ras.
531,533 (1994).
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desegregated schools. 8 Aside from purely normative or aesthetic reasons to
prefer a society in which individuals of different races interact on a regular
basis, interracial contact is instrumentally valuable in breaking down barriers
to informal social networks and "opportunity structures" that have historically
excluded racial minorities.19
B. A More Restrictive Framework for Desegregation Remedies
Dismantling Desegregation's analysis of how the Supreme Court's
desegregation jurisprudence over the past twenty-five years has constrained
the duration and extensiveness of judicial remedies is also instructive. The
Court's decision in Milliken I clearly was an important turning point in the
evolution of desegregation law. Most northern cities have evolved in a
manner similar to Detroit: rings of relatively affluent, predominantly white
municipalities and school districts surround a relatively poor, predominantly
minority urban core. 80 Even in cities that have retained a substantial number
of affluent residents, the city school districts are nonetheless largely minority
and largely poor, as middle- and upper-class parents have abandoned the
public school system to enroll their children in private schools.' Because
Milliken Iforbade interdistrict desegregation absent a showing of "a signifi-
cant segregative effect in another district" - a very steep burden for plain-
tiffs - it undercut much of Brown's potential in the North.
Perhaps more important, Milliken I foreclosed the possibility that court-
ordered desegregation would produce meaningful socioeconomic integration
in the North. Dating back to the landmark Coleman Report' published in
178. See Braddock, supra note 177, at 185; Braddock & McPartland, supra note 175, at
272; Braddock & McPartland, supra note 164, at 8-10, 63; Liebman, supra note 164, at 1627;
powell, supra note 8, at 789-90; Wells & Crain, supra note 177, at 551.
179. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW
URBAN POOR 63-66 (1996); powell, supra note 8, at 758.
180. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 64-69 (1993); DAVID RUSK, CrrIES
WITHOUT SUBURBS xv, 1-2 (2d ed. 1995); WILSON, supra note 179, at 46-48; David Rusk,
Reuniting City andSuburb: The Key to Inner-City Progress, in DOUBLE EXPOSURE: POVERTY
AND RACE IN AMERICA 217, 217-20 (1997). For an illuminating analysis of how government
policy led to racial and economic segregation inAmerican metropolitan areas and how economic
and structural forces perpetuate such segregation, see Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries
ofRace: Political Geography in LegalAnalysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1843, 1847-85 (1994).
181. For instance, in 1986 the 25 largest central city school systems in the United States
contained 30% of the nation's Latino students, 27% of the African American students, and only
3% of the white students. See Gary Orfield, Metropolitan School Desegregation: Impacts on
Metropolitan Society, 80 MINN. L. REv. 825, 842 (1996).
182. JAMES S. COLEMAN, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, EQUALITY
OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 304 (1966).
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1966, empirical research on the determinants of educational achievement has
found that the socioeconomic status (SES) of a student's peers exerts a sig-
nificant influence on academic progress. 83 When all else is held equal, lower
SES students improve academically when placed in schools with higher SES
students."8 4 Because the average African American or Latino public school
student comes from a lower socioeconomic background than the average
183. See, e.g., JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S
SCHOOLS 118-20, 125-29 (1990) (providing regression analysis demonstrating that school SES
has statistically significant influence on student achievement); COLEMAN, supra note 182, at21;
MARTIN THRuPP, THE SCHOOL MIX EFFECT: HOW THE SOCIAL CLASS COMPOSITION OF SCHOOL
INTAKES SHAPE SCHOOL PROCESSES AND STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT 22-25 (1997) (reviewing
numerous studies demonstrating significant "school mix effect" correlating education achieve-
ment with socioeconomic status); MARKG. YUDOFETAL., EDUCATIONAL POLICYANDTHELAW
597 (3d ed. 1992) (noting that research has demonstrated that"[c]hildren of low socioeconomic
status appeared to benefit significantly from exposure to more affluent and more highly moti-
vated peers"); Anthony S. Bryk etal., High School Organization and Its Effects on Teachers and
Students: An Interpretive Summary of the Research, in CHOICE AND CONTROL IN AMERICAN
EDUCATION 135, 150 (William H. Clune & John F. Witte eds., 1990); Christopher S. Jencks,
The Coleman Report and the Conventional Wisdom, in ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY 69,87-88 (Frederick Mosteller& Daniel P. Moynihan eds., 1972) (re-examining
the EEOS data used in Coleman Report and finding that "[p]oor black sixth graders in over-
whelmingly middle-class schools were about 20 months ahead of poor black sixth graders in
overwhelmingly lower-class schools," and that "[tihe differences for poor white sixth graders
were similar"); Susan E. Mayer & Christopher Jencks, Growing Up in Poor Neighborhoods:
How Much Does It Matter?, 243 SCIENCE 1441, 1442 (1989) (noting that "teenagers who live
in high SES neighborhoods attain more schooling than teenagers from similar families who live
in lower SES neighborhoods," that "[tihere is some evidence that attending school with high
SES classmates raises children's test scores," and that "[a]ttending high school with affluent
classmates may also increase astudent'schances ofgraduating"); Richard J. MurnaneEvidence,
Analysis, and Unanswered Questions, 51 HARV. EDUC. REV. 483, 486 (1981) ("[O]ne of the
most effective ways to improve children's cognitive skills is to put them in an environment with
other children who want to acquire cognitive skills and whose families support such learning.");
Martin E. Orland, Demographics of Disadvantage: Intensity of Childhood Poverty and Its
Relationship to Educational Achievement, in ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE: THE CONTINUING
AGENDAFOROuRNATION'SSCHOOLS 43,46(1994); James S. Liebman, Voice, Not Choice, 101
YALE L.J. 259, 267 (1991) (book review) (explaining that "a well-developed literature estab-
lishes that achievement levels depend not only on one's own and one's parents educational
expectations, but also on the expectations of one's schoolmates and their parents").
184. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 182, at 304 (finding that "an impressive percent of
variance [in student achievement] is accounted for by student body characteristics" and that "the
environment provided by the student body is asymmetric in its effects, [such] that it has its
greatest effect on those from educationally deficient backgrounds"); Gary Orfield & David
Thronson, Dismantling Desegregation: Uncertain Gains, Unexpected Costs, 42 EMORY L.J.
759, 783 (1993) (finding that low-income students in San Francisco who transferred to high
achieving schools showed significantgains in achievement despite no increase in school funding
or special programs at those schools, while students who stayed at predominantly low-income
schools showed no increase in achievement despite millions of dollars in increased funding).
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white student,18 an important potential benefit of racial desegregation is to
place socioeconomically disadvantaged students in schools surrounded by
relatively advantaged peers. Indeed, Mahard and Crain's analysis found that
desegregation plans encompassing entire metropolitan areas produced the
greatest benefits to black students, indicating that desegregation is most effec-
tive when it "represents the most complete form of socioeconomic desegrega-
tion." ' 6 By rejecting the district court's interdistrict remedy, however, the
Court limited most desegregation plans in the North to integrating those
students who remained in urban public schools, a disproportionately poor
group. Milliken Itherefore substantially restricted a crucial educational bene-
fit that desegregation might offer.
This is not to say that a different outcome in Milliken I would have
necessarily altered the ultimate course of school desegregation in the North.
Political forces and private behavior might well have prevented metropolitan
desegregation from ever occurring, regardless of the Court's decision. In the
early 1970s, a sizable majority of Americans opposed busing.187 The backlash
in response to the district court's order in Detroit was reminiscent of the
South's massive resistance to Brown: rabid demonstrators in Pontiac burned
buses,"' and George Wallace prevailed in the 1972 Michigan Democratic
primary."' President Nixon made opposition to busing a centerpiece of his
reelection campaign." On March 16, 1972, he addressed the country on
185. See Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REV.
855, 877-78 (1995); infra text accompanying notes 256-62.
186. Mahard & Crain, supra note 164, at 118. In fact Coleman concluded in Equality of
Educational Opportunity that "[tihe higher achievement of all racial and ethnic groups in
schools with greater proportions of white students is largely, perhaps wholly, related to effects
associated with the student body's educational background and aspirations." COLEMAN, supra
note 182, at 307.
187. See GODFREY HODGSON, AMERICA IN OuR TIME 455 (1976) (stating that "the great
majority, without any rabid racist opposition to busing, nevertheless didn't like it and were
prepared to considermost other alternatives"); KLUGER, supra note 119, at765-66; WILKINSON,
supra note 127, at 230 ("Antibusing atmospherics of the mid-1970s seemed no different than
southern school openings of the late 1950s."). In response to mandatory desegregation plans
in Boston and Seattle in the mid-1970s, the relatively progressive states of Massachusetts and
Washington passed referendathat forbid busing for purposes of racial balance. See WILKINSON,
supra note 127, at 248.
188. See HODGSON, supra note 187, at 454.
189. See PAULR. DMOND, BEYOND BUSING: INSIDETHE CHALLENGETO URBAN SEGREGA-
TION 86 (1985); WILKINSON, supra note 127, at 248. Bumper stickers throughout the Detroit
area pilloried the district court judge who had issued the metropolitan-wide order, Judge
Stephen J. Roth, with epithets such as "Roth is a four-letter word" and "Roth is a child mo-
lester." DIMOND, sup-a, at 76.
190. See HERBERT S. PARmET, RICHARD NIXON AND IES AMERICA 594-97 (1990); Alex-
anderM. Bickel, Busing: What's To Be Done?, in THENEWREPBLICREADER: EIGHTYYEARS
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national television to propose legislation placing a moratorium on court-
ordered busing to achieve racial balance. 9' At the Democratic convention
that summer, party members vigorously debated whether to include an anti-
busing provision in its platform, with liberals Hubert Humphrey and Edmund
Muskie proposing a compromise that called on Congress to forbid interdistrict
busing until the Supreme Court issued a controlling decision."9 Congress
considered an antibusing constitutional amendment in 1972,"93 and it might
well have adopted a similar measure in 1974 had the Court upheld the inter-
district plan in Milliken.194 At a minimum, such a decision would have
prompted significantly higher enrollments at private schools in metropolitan
areas under desegregation orders, undermining the actual achievement of
racial and socioeconomic integration.
Even so, Orfield's contention that Milliken Iwas an important turning
point still seems valid. In 1974, how extensive the project of school desegre-
gation would ultimately become was uncertain. It is possible that political
resistance in northern suburbs could have been overcome, or at least amelio-
rated, much as it ultimately was in the South. And while resistance might
have created implementation problems, a different outcome would have at
least placed the force of inertia in favor of metropolitan remedies. In short,
Milliken I was a significant defeat for pro-desegregation forces.
Orfield is also correct to identify the Rehnquist Court's three desegrega-
tion decisions as another important shift in desegregation law. Dowell, Free-
man, and Jenkins did not alter any of the basic doctrinal principles in the area;
OF OPINIONAND DEBATE 400, 400 (Dorothy Wickenden ed., 1994); see also WILKINSON, supra
note 127, at 217 ("[Nixon's] southern strategy dismissed the black vote; his domestic advisor
had counseled 'benign neglect' of black problems.").
191. See Robert B. Semple Jr., Nixon Asks for Bill Imposing Halt in New Busing Orders;
Seeks Education Equality, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1972, at Al. In that address, Nixon clearly
appealed to northern suburban voters who feared the implications ofmetropolitan desegregation:
[Parents] want their children educated in their own neighborhoods. Many have
invested their life savings in a home in a neighborhood they chose because it had
good schools. They do not want their children bused across the city to an inferior
school just to meet some social planner's concept of what is considered to be the
correct racial balance or what is called progressive social policy.
Transcript of Nixon's Statement on School Busing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1972, at A22.
Congress ultimately adopted a watered-down version of Nixon's proposal, which forbid the
implementation of busing until the appeals process had been fully exhausted. See HODsoN,
supra note 187, at 454; Peter Lisagor, Nixon Rips College Bill but Signs It, CI. DAILYNEWS,
Jun. 24-25, 1972, at 1.
192. See William McGaffin, Busing to Trigger Hottest Plaform Fight, CHI. DAILYNEWS,
July 10, 1972, at 1.
193. See HODGSON, supra note 187, at 454.
194. See WILKINSON, supra note 127, at 227.
HeinOnline  -- 56 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 197 1999
56 WASH. & LEE L. REV 169 (1999)
each addressed a relatively well-settled legal issue or resolved the case on
rather narrow grounds. Nonetheless, the three decisions collectively reveal
the Court's general discontent with the continuation of court-enforced deseg-
regation remedies. Consistent with the Court's broader constitutional agenda,
Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins reveal the Court's intent to bring a quiet close
to the era of school desegregation administered by federal district courts. 9
There are four principal reasons for this conclusion. Most prominently,
the outcome in each case expedited the withdrawal of judicial supervision
over the respective school districts and hastened their return to local control.
Of course, the outcomes themselves are insufficientto conclude thatthe Court
has abandoned desegregation remedies. The particular circumstances of the
cases could have necessitated decisions that curtailed further desegregation
regardless of the Court's broader agenda. Nonetheless, the outcomes are an
important starting point, particularly because, prior to Dowell, the Court had
only issued three desegregation decisions in favor of school districts in the
forty-one years since Brown."
Second, ending court-enforced desegregation is wholly consistent with,
and indeed complements, the Rehnquist Court's broader constitutional priori-
ties. The prolonged supervision of school systems by federal courts for
purposes of implementing desegregation remedies contravenes three of the
Court's principal tenets. First, desegregation remedies, which are necessarily
race-conscious, 197 coexist uneasily with the Rehnquist Court's understanding
ofthe Equal Protection Clause as requiring color-blind governmental action. "s
In a series of affirmative action and redistricting decisions, the Court has
emphasized that race-conscious state action is constitutionally permissible
only in extremely rare circumstances,'9 if at all."° Second, the displacement
195. See Joondeph, supra note 8, at 660-61.
196. Those three decisions were Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), affed, 433 U.S. 267
(1977), Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976), and Dayton
Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977) (Dayton 1).
197. See Kevin Brown, The Implications ofthe EqualProtection Clausefor theMandatory
Integration ofPublic School Students, 29 CONN. L. REv. 999, 1013 (1997) ("School districts
[can] not simply use racially neutral student assignment methods to remedy the effects of dejure
segregation if those methods [do] not produce real desegregation.").
198. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Color-Blind Court, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 791,791 (1996) ("The
ideal of a color-blind Constitution is close to securing five votes on the Supreme Court for the
first time since it was considered and rejected during Reconstruction.").
199. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 904-05 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S.
900, 904-05 (1995); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefla, 515 U.S. 200, 221-27 (1995); Shaw
v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657-58 (1993); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
493-94 (1989).
200. See Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("In my view,
government can never have a 'compelling interest' in discriminating on the basis of race in
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of politically accountable state and local officials by federal courts in the
administration and governance of public school systems violates traditional
norms of federalism, norms that have resurged in importance under the
Rehnquist Court.2"' Perhaps the current Court's defining theme has been its
renewed emphasis on the constitutional limitations of federal power and the
independent sovereignty of state governments. 202 The Court has stated that
these norms are particularly relevant in the context of public education, where
"[s]tates historically have been sovereign. ' ,2 3 Finally, ongoing supervision of
public school systems conflicts with the Rehnquist Court's conception of the
limited role and institutional competence of Article III courts. The Court has
repeatedly emphasized the limited role of federal courts in our constitutional
structure, and it has been particularly hostile to ongoing judicial involvement
in the administration of government programs instigated by institutional
orderto 'make up' forpastracial discrimination inthe opposite direction."); id. at240 (Thomas,
J., concurring) ("I believe that there is a 'moral [and] constitutional equivalence' . . . between
laws designed to subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits on the basis of race in order
to foster some current notion of equality." (citation omitted)).
201. See, e.g.,Printzv. United States, 117 S. CL 2365,2384(1997) (holding that require-
ment of Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act's interim provisions that state law enforce-
ment officers conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers imposed uncon-
stitutional obligation on state officials to execute federal law); Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
116 S. Ct. 1114, 1119 (1996) (overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989),
to hold that Congress lacks authority under Commerce Clause to abrogate states' sovereign
immunity); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,552 (1995) (holding Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990 unconstitutional as beyond Congress's powerunder Commerce Clause); Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,519-20 (1992) (holding thatfederal CigaretteLabeling and
Advertising Act did not preempt state law damages actions); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 176-77 (1992) (striking down federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act's
"take title" provision - which required states either to take ownership of low level waste or
regulate its disposal according to instructions of Congress - as unconstitutional "commandeer-
ing" of states' regulatory powers); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 469-70 (1991) (holding
that Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) does not proscribe states from imposing
mandatory retirement ages on statejudges and that displacing state prerogatives in determining
qualifications of state government officials disrupts usual balance between federal and state
powers, and therefore Congress needed to make this intention clear, which it did not do in
ADEA).
202. See, e.g., Daniel Farber, The Constitution 'sForgotten CoverLetter: AnEssayon the
New Federalism andthe Original Understanding, 94 MIcH.L. REv. 615,621-26 (1995); Vicki
C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 2181, 2181-82 (1998); Bernard Schwartz, Federalism, Administrative Law, and the
Rehnquist Court in Action, 32 TULSA L.J. 477, 477-78 (1997); Robert Marquand, Rehnquist-
Led Court Shifts Power to States, CHRIsTIAN Sci. MoNIToR, Apr. 17, 1996, at 1; Jeffrey Rosen,
Dual Sovereigns, THENEW REPUBLIC, July 28, 1997, at 16.
203. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995); see id at 580 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (stating that "it is well established that education is a traditional concern of the
States").
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litigation.2" Hastening the end ofjudicially imposed desegregation remedies
is therefore fully consistent with the Court's broader constitutional priorities.
The third reason that Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins have signaled an
important shift is that the Court's rhetorical emphasis in the opinions differed
considerably from that of its earlier desegregation opinions. Until recently,
the Court's desegregation decisions generally stressed the goal of ensuring
that all vestiges of discrimination be removed from school systems that once
were de jure segregated. For instance, the Court stated that school districts
found liable for unlawful segregation must ensure the "all-out desegregation"
of the system's schools,2 5 and that formerly dejure school districts may not
"achiev[e] anything less than complete uprooting of the dual public school
system."'2"6 It underscored that a formerly segregated school district's "contin-
uing 'affirmative duty to disestablish the dual system' is... beyond ques-
tion. 2 7 The Rehnquist Court's decisions, in contrast, have emphasized the
importance of returning public school systems to the control of local, politi-
cally accountable officials as soon as practicable. In all three opinions, the
Court began its analysis with the premise that "federal supervision of local
school systems was intended as a temporary measure."2 ' It has stated that
"local autonomy of school districts is a vital national tradition"2 9 that "allows
citizens to participate in decisionmaking, and allows innovation so that school
programs can fit local needs,"21 and that "in the absence ofjudicial supervi-
204. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 112 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("The necessary restrictions on [federal courts'] jurisdiction and authority contained in Article
III of the Constitution limit the judiciary's intitutional capacity to prescribe palliatives for
societal ills."). This strand of the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence is perhaps best exemplified
by its decisions involving the constitutional rights of prisoners, in which the Court has repeat-
edly emphasized that it generally is not thejudiciary's place to stand in judgment of how prison
administrators carry out their duties. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990)
(upholding state policy that permitted corrections officials to administer antipsychotic drugs to
inmates against their will without prior hearings); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342,
351-52 (1987) (upholding prison regulations that prevented Muslim inmates from attending
particular congregational service); Tumerv. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,81-82,91-93 (1987) (uphold-
ing regulations that restricted correspondence between inmates at different institutions to that
between family members and that concerning legal matters unless correspondence was in "best
interests" of inmates).
205. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 214 n.18 (1973).
206. United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484, 491 (1972).
207. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 460 (1979) (quoting McDaniel v.
Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971)).
208. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 88 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247
(1991)); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992) (same); Dowell, 498 U.S. at 247.
209. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 99; Freeman, 503 U.S. at 490.
210. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248.
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sion, [schools] can be held accountable to the citizenry, to the political pro-
cess, and to the courts in the ordinary course."2"' Thus, "[r]eturning schools
to the control of local authorities at the earliest practicable date is essential to
restore their true accountability in our governmental system.1
212
These complementary points-that desegregation remedies were intended
to be temporary and that local control over public education is a valuable
tradition-are not new to desegregation cases. Indeed, the Court has expressed
these ideas in one form or another throughout its desegregation jurisprudence
since Brown. The change has been in the prominence and emphasis that these
themes have received in the Rehnquist Court's opinions. Instead of constitut-
ing two among several decisional factors, they appear inDowell, Freeman, and
Jenkins to have become the Court's predominant concerns.
Finally, the Court's questionable reasoning suggests the existence of an
important subtextto the opinions. In Freeman, for instance, the Court claimed
merely to make explicit the reasoning of its 1976 decision in Pasadena Board
of Education v. Spangler."3 But Freeman's conclusion that school districts
could achieve unitary status in a piecemeal fashion, and that district courts
could consequently withdraw their supervision incrementally, actually decided
a moderately significant, unresolved issue in desegregation law.214 Moreover,
it did so in a fashion that created the possibility that school districts would be
released from judicial supervision without ever having eliminated the racial
identifiability of their schools.
215
The Court's analysis in Jenkins was more clearly suspect. In holding that
the district court's salary relief order was impermissible under Milliken I, the
Court conceptualized the term "interdistrict remedy" quite expansively. 26
Unlike the desegregation plan in Milliken 1, the remedy in Jenkins only im-
posed affirmative obligations on the KCMSD. It was interdistrict only in the
sense that it sought to attract white students attending private schools or sur-
rounding suburban school districts to enroll voluntarily in the KCMSD. In
holding thatthese indirecteffects madethe desegregation plan an "interdistrict
remedy," the Court largely blurred the intradistrict and interdistrict distinction,
as every desegregation plan has some impact beyond the school district's
boundaries." 7 Moreover, even conceding that the plan in Jenkins constituted
211. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 490.
212. Id.
213. 427 U.S. 424 (1976); see Freeman, 503 U.S. at 489 ("Today we make explicit the
rationale that was central in Spangler.").
214. See Joondeph, supra note 62, at 157.
215. See id. at 166-67.
216. See Joondeph, supra note 8, at 630-36.
217. See id. at 630-35.
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an interdistrict remedy, it was still justifiable under Milliken I so long as the
"constitutional violation... produce[d] a significant segregative effect in
another district."2 ' Although the district court in Jenkins found that no
surrounding suburban districts had engaged in unlawful discrimination, it did
find that de jure segregation in the KCMSD had caused white flight from
Kansas City schools.2" That is, it concluded that the KCMSD's intradistrict
constitutional violation had resulted in incrementally more white families
leaving the school system, leaving the KCMSD more racially isolated than it
would have been absent the unlawful discrimination. Yet the Court still
rejected the remedy, concluding that the district court's white flight finding
was "both inconsistent internally, and inconsistent with the typical supposi-
tion.., that 'white flight' may result from desegregation, not dejure segrega-
tion."" 0 In essence, the Court overturned Kansas City's longstanding desegre-
gation program on the ground that the district court had erred nine years
earlier in concluding that the KCMSD's declining white enrollment was
causally related to the school district's past discrimination."
The outcomes in Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins may not be necessarily
wrong or unjustifiable, but the decisions have changed more than their ex-
plicit holdings would indicate. They unmistakably reveal the Court's desire
to see the judicial supervision of formerly segregated school districts end and
control returned to politically accountable local officials as soon as practica-
ble. Orfield therefore is entirely correct in identifying these decisions as
another important shift in the Court's approach to court-ordered desegregation
that has curtailed the duration and extensiveness of permissible judicial
remedies.
218. Milliken 1, 418 U.S. 717,745 (1974), affd, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
219. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 161 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 95 (footnote omitted).
221. See Richard Thompson Ford, Geography andSovereignty: Jurisdictional Formation
and Racial Segregation, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1387 (1997). Curiously, the Court's opinion
omitted several steps that one would have expected given its reasoning: (a) the Court never
explicitly acknowledged that it was reversing the district court's judgment on the basis of a
factual finding; (b) the Court never articulated the appropriate "clearly erroneous" standard of
review mandated by Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (c) the Court ignored
the "two court rule," which dictates that the Supreme Court should reverse a factual finding
affirmed by a court of appeals only under "the most exceptional circumstances," Branti v.
Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 512 n.6 (1980), when there is "a very obvious and exceptional showing
of error," Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 336 U.S. 271,275 (1949), aff'din
part on reh 'g, 339 U.S. 605 (1950); and (d) the Court did not seriously weigh the evidence
relied on by the district court or explain why the district court's conclusion regarding white
flight was implausible. See Joondeph, supra note 8, at 640-53. Moreover, this factual finding
had been reviewed and affirmed by the Eighth Circuit on three separate occasions, and the
Supreme Court had previously denied certiorari on the question. See id. at 641-42 & n.243.
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C. The Meaning of Brown and the Degree of Dismantling
The present doctrinal framework for desegregation remedies clearly is
more restrictive than what appeared possible in the early 1970s. Milliken I
substantially limited the geographic breadth of permissible desegregation
plans, Washington v. Davis' limited school districts' liability to instances of
dejure segregation, and the Rehnquist Court's decisions have directed district
courts to release formerly segregated school districts from judicial supervision
as soon as practicable. But these developments do not constitute a "quiet
reversal" of Brown. Such a contention is based on an understanding of Brown
that is much broader than the Court's decisions permit. Indeed, Orfield's
claim is founded on a conception of desegregation remedies that is more
expansive than one could have ever realistically expected the judiciary to
embrace.
To Orfield, Brown was not simply concerned with de jure segregation
and its traceable effects. Rather, "Brown's promise.., was that government
would protect minority students' rights to equal opportunity in education. '
Properly understood, Brown targeted the "highly unequal structure ofopportu-
nity" " and "the roots of racial inequality"' in American public education.
Thus, the appropriate remedy for school segregation is not only the elimina-
tion of intentional desegregation and its vestiges, but also the production of
schools in which opportunities are "genuinely equal" between minority and
white children." 6
What is more, Orfield's conception of equal educational opportunity is
substantive, not formalistic. Equal educational opportunity does not mean
merely the absence of formal, state-imposed barriers to advancement. Nor is
it necessarily satisfied by the provision of equal educational inputs. Rather,
Orfield's conception of opportunity is inextricably intertwined with out-
comes. 7 Educational opportunities are unequal when millions of minority
children are consigned to "[s]chools with large numbers of impoverished
students tending to have much lower test scores, higher dropout rates, fewer
students in demanding classes, less well-prepared teachers, and a low percent-
age of students who will eventually finish college." 8 Thus, under Brown,
222. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
223. ORFMLD ET AL., supra note 2, at xix; see Liebman, supra note 164, at 1485-86 &
n.123 (describing equal educational opportunity theory and citing commentators who have
endorsed this understanding of Brown).
224. ORFILD ET AL., supra note 2, at 50.
225. l at 4.
226. Id at 75.
227. See supra note 18.
228. ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 53.
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desegregation remedies should not end until the "education for minority
students ha[s] become more equal to that of white students in the metropolitan
area in terms of achievement test scores, graduation, college preparation, and
other educational measures."'2 Formerly segregated school districts should
have to demonstrate "actual racial equality" with "a narrowing of academic
gaps between the races."'"0
But the Supreme Court has never embraced such a broad understanding
of Brown or its consequent remedies. Concededly, the Court stated in Brown
that public education, "where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms."'23 To read this language
as demanding actual equivalence in chances to achieve academic success,
however, is to take it well out of context. For several years after the decision,
the Court appeared to endorse the limited principle that the appropriate
remedy for school segregation was purely prohibitory, requiring school
districts to do no more than desist from intentionally discriminating on the
basis of race,2 and this only with "all deliberate speed.'" 3 In Brown II, for
instance, the Court stated that the relief to which the plaintiffs were entitled
was their "admission to public schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscrim-
inatory basis"' 4 and that formerly de jure school districts were required "to
achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a
nonracial basis.'"S Two years later, in Cooper v. Aaron, 6 the Court equated
"desegregation" with "the immediate general admission of Negro children,
229. Id. at 75.
230. Id. at 4.
231. Brown 1, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
232. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 503-04 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The
constitutional right is equal racial access to schools, not access to racially equal schools ....
We apparently envisioned no more than this in our initial post-Brown cases." (footnote omit-
ted)); Mark Tushnet, The Significance of Brown v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 173,
175 (1994) (noting that view that Brown merely forbid state-imposed segregation "was almost
universally shared in the years immediately following Brown"). Several lower court decisions
between Brown and Green also endorsed the prohibitory approach. See, e.g., Bell v. School
City of Gary, 324 F.2d 209, 213 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964); Griffin v.
Board of Supervisors, 322 F.2d 332,336-37 (4th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Boson
v. Rippy, 285 F.2d 43, 45-46 (5th Cir. 1960); Borders v. Rippy, 247 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir.
1957); Jackson v. School Bd., 203 F. Supp. 701 (W.D. Va. 1962), rev'd, 321 F.2d 230 (4th Cir.
1963); Brown v. Board of Educ., 139 F. Supp. 468 (D. Kan. 1955); Briggs v. Elliot, 132 F.
Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
233. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) [hereinafter Brown 11].
234. Id. at 300.
235. Id at 300-01.
236. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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otherwise qualified as students for their appropriate classes, at particular
schools. , 2
7
In Green and Swann, the Court abandoned this prohibitory approach to
desegregation remedies and adopted a broader, corrective framework. 8 The
Court required formerly segregated school districts not only to end their
discriminatory practices, but also to affirmatively eliminate any lingering
effects of the de jure system. 9 Yet even during this expansion of Brown's
remedial reach, the Court clearly adhered to the principle that the objective of
desegregation remedies was only to place the school system in the position
that it would have occupied had it never been de jure segregated. In striking
down New Kent County's "freedom of choice" plan in Green because it failed
to produce "effective" desegregation, the Court stated that Brown required
"meaningful and immediate progress toward disestablishing state-imposed
segregation"'24 and the "dismantling of the state-imposed dual system."
241
And in Swann, in which the Court articulated its broadest vision ever of
desegregation remedies, the Court still underscored the premise that the
objective in desegregation cases is only "to see that school authorities exclude
no pupil of a racial minority from any school, directly or indirectly, .on ac-
count of race."242 In fact, Swann expressly declined to require the elimination
of completely segregated schools from a formerly de jure segregated dis-
trict;243 so long as the segregation is not a product of the district's past dis-
crimination, "the existence of some small number of one-race, or virtually
one-race, schools" is permissible.2"
More conspicuously, the Court in Swann took pains to deflate expecta-
tions concerning the breadth of Brown's constitutional guarantee, explicitly
acknowledging the limits of its institutional capacities. It cautioned that
desegregation remedies were not meant to address the "myriad factors of
human existence which can cause discrimination in a multitude of ways"245
237. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 7 (1958).
238. See supra text accompanying notes 28-41.
239. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) ("The
objective today remains to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges-of state-imposed
segregation."); Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 440 (1968) ("[S]chool officials have
the continuing duty to take whatever action may be necessary to create a unitary, non-racial
system." (quoting Bowman v. County Sch. Bd., 382 F.2d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 1967) (en banc)
(Sobeloff, J., concurring))).
240. Green, 391 U.S. at 439.
241. Id.
242. Swann, 402 U.S. at 23.
243. Id at 25-26.
244. Id. at 26.
245. Id at 22.
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and "cannot embrace all the problems of racial prejudice, even when those
problems contribute to disproportionate racial concentrations in some
schools. '246 Indeed, "[t]he elimination of racial discrimination in public
schools is a large task and one that should not be retarded by efforts to achieve
broader purposes lying beyond the jurisdiction of school authorities. 2 47
Nowhere in either Green or Swann did the Court speak of Brown's require-
ments in terms of educational outcomes.
As discussed earlier, the Court's decisions subsequent to Swann have
generally narrowed Brown's remedial framework. In Milliken I1, the Court
expanded the range of permissible remedies to include compensatory educa-
tional programs. Even so, such remedies are only permissible where students'
educational deficits are proximately traceable to the dejure violation, and they
must end once the effects of past discrimination have been eliminated.
Indeed, it would be impermissible, even in a Milliken 11 case, for a district
court to require a school district to equalize achievement for white and minor-
ity students.
Thus, at all points since Brown, the permissible objective of desegrega-
tion has not exceeded eliminating the constitutional violation of dejure segre-
gation and its lingering effects.28 Remedial orders are limited "to restor[ing]
246. Id at 23.
247. Id at 22.
248. Arguably, the Court could have held in the early 1970s that Brown forbid de facto as
well as dejure segregation, which would have substantially extended its remedial breadth. See
Susan Frelich Appleton, Comment, Alternative Schools for Minority Students: The Constitu-
tion, the CivilRights Act, andthe Berkeley Experiment, 61 CAL. L. Rv. 858,875 (1973) (spec-
ulating contemporaneously that Swann "arguably supports... remedies for de facto segrega-
tion"). Michael Klarman has contended that, had the issue fairly presented itself while Earl
Warren remained Chief Justice, the Court may well have held that racial imbalances in public
schools violated the Equal Protection Clause, regardless of intent. See Michael Klarman, An
Interpretive History ofModern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 281-82 (1991). And
in his biography of Justice Lewis Powell, John Jeffries has asserted that internal Supreme Court
documents reveal that, as the Court considered Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189
(1973), a majority of Justices actually supported eliminating the dejure/de facto distinction, but
division among the Justices over the issue of busing prevented this position from becoming a
holding of the Court. See JOHN C. JEFFERMS, JR., JusTIcE LuWis F. POWELL, JR. 302-05 (1994).
Nonetheless, setting aside the question of whether federal courts would have actually imple-
mented such abroad mandate in the face of population shifts and demographic changes-which
would have essentially placed school districts in the quasi-permanent receivership of federal
district courts - this standard would still have dictated remedies far narrower than the true
equalization of educational opportunities. Presumably, a prohibition of de facto segregation
would have required public school districts to ensure that the racial compositions ofeach school
roughly approximated the racial balance of the district as a whole. As such, desegregation
remedies would have focused exclusively on racial balance and would have given courts no
license to inquire into substantive educational opportunities or outcomes. Thus, the persistence
206
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the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occu-
pied in the absence of such conduct.""4 9 Unless racial imbalances or other
educational inequalities are causally related to past discrimination by the
school district, they present no constitutional concerns."0 Hence, Orfield's
understanding of Brown as requiring the equalization of educational outcomes
in formerly segregated school districts is not only at odds with the Court's
precedent prior to Dowell, but it is inconsistent with any plausible reading of
the Court's decisions since 1954.
Moreover, the notion that the Court nonetheless should have interpreted
Brown as requiring greater equality of educational outcomes as a remedy for
school segregation overestimates the institutional capacities of courts. Racial
disparities in educational achievement are the product of a wide range of
environmental factors. The greatest determinant of educational achievement,
excluding preexisting ability, is the family background of the student."
of racial inequalities in realms such as test scores, graduation rates, or rates of college atten-
dance would have still fallen outside the remedial calculus.
249. Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974).
250. See generally Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,240 (1976); Keyes v. School Dist.
No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 198 (1973).
251. See, e.g., CHUBB & MOE, supra note 183, at 105-09, 125-29; COLEMAN, supra note
182, at 325; SHELLEY DRAZEN, STUDENr ACHIEVEMENT AND FAMILY AND COMMUNITY Pov-
ERTY: TWENTY YEARS OF EDUCATION REFORM 12 (1992); MICHAEL P. GALLAGHER, PROFI-
CIENCY TESTING AND POVERTY: LOOKING WITHIN A LARGE URBAN DISTRICT 4 (1993); KIM
KRUSE, THE EFFECTS OF A Low SOCIOECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT ON A STUDENT'S AcADEMIC
ACHIEVEMENT 15 (1996); OMAR S. LOPEZ, THE EFFECT OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
CLASSROOM STUDENT DIVERsrrY AND TEACHER CAPACITY ON STUDENT PERFORMANCE 17
(1995); MARYBETH WALPOLE, COLLEGE AND CLASS STATUS: THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL CLASS
BACKGROUND ON COLLEGE IMPACT AND OUTCOMES 2 (1997); Robert B. Cairns et al., Early
School Dropout: Configurations and Determinants, 60 CHILD DEv. 1437, 1445-46, 1448
(1989); Ruth B. Ekstrom et al., Who Drops Out of High School and Why? Findings from a
National Study, in SCHOOL DROPOUTS: PATTERNS AND POLICIES 52, 60 (Gary Natriello ed.,
1987); Frederick Mosteller & Daniel P. Moynihan, A Pathbreaking Report: Further Studies
of the Coleman Report, in ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 3, 22 (Frederick
Mosteller & Daniel P. Moynihan eds., 1972); Russell W. Rumberger, High School Dropouts:
A Review of Issues and Evidence, 57 REv. EDUC. RES. 101, 108 (1987); Geoffrey F. Schultz,
Socioeconomic Advantage and Achievement Motivation: Important Mediators ofAcademic
Performance in Minority Children in Urban Schools, 25 URB. REv. 221,228 (1993); Liebman,
supra note 183, at 266-27; COLLEGE BOARD ONLINE, SAT PROGRAM: COLLEGE-BOUND
SENIORS 1997 NATIONAL REPORT (visited June 15, 1998) <http://www.collegeboard.org/satf
html/cbtbk397.htinl> (demonstrating strong correlation between SAT scores in 1997 and both
family income and highest level of parental education). But see JENCKS, supra note 156, at 9
(concluding that gap between whites and African Americans on test scores "shrinks only a little
when black and white families have the same amount of schooling, the same income, and the
same wealth"); Sammis B. White et al., Socioeconomic Status andAchievement Revisited, 28
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Students from families with lower incomes, less wealth, and less educational
attainment, measured by the quantity and quality of their parents' and grandpar-
ents' schooling, do worse on standard measures of educational achievement.'
The reasons for this influence are varied, but clearly, poor students suffer
disproportionately from problems that inhibit their ability to learn, such as
malnutrition, developmental disorders, and untreated health problems. 3
Their families tend to move more frequently, preventing schools or teachers
from either developing a close relationship with the student or tracking his
development."4 And the educational background of a child's parents appears
to exert a strong influence on a student's approach to school, the learning that
takes place at home, and overall educational expectations."5
The significant disparities in socioeconomic status between whites and
racial minorities, particularly African Americans and Latinos, mean that the
average black or Latino child begins at a substantial disadvantage relative to
white children in the competition for academic success. The median incomes
of African American and Latino households in 1995 were $22,393 and
$22,860 respectively, compared to $35,766 for white households. 6 The
median net worth of white households in 1993 was $45,740, more than ten
times greater than the median net worth of black households ($4418) and nine
times greater than the figure for Latino households ($4656)." 7 While 26.4%
of black families and 27.0% of Latino families fell below the poverty line in
1995, only 8.5% of white families did so." s Most troublesome, a staggering
URB. EDUC. 328,337-42 (1993) (contending that most researchers have overstated relationship
between student SES and achievement).
252. See Meredith Phillips et al., Family Background, ParentingPractices, andthe Black-
White Test Score Gap, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra note 156, at 103, 138
(concluding that index of family environment broader than traditional definition of socioeco-
nomic status may explain up to two-thirds of gap in test scores between whites and African
Americans); supra note 251.
253. See ORFIELD E'AL., supra note 2, at 54.
254. See id
255. See CHUBB & MOE, supra note 183, at 106-08 & tbl. 4-4, 334 (correlating parental
education with students' academic performance); JENCKS, supra note 156, at 175-77 (document-
ing relationship between high school dropout rates and parents' level of educational attainment);
Liebman, supra note 183, at 266-68.
256. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THEUNITED STATES 1997,465 tbl. 717 (117th ed. 1997) [hereinafter STATITICALABSTRACT];
see also Glenn C. Loury, Unequalized, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 6, 1998, at 11; Black-White
Income Inequalities, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1998, at A18.
257. SeeAsset Ownership ofHouseholds: 1993, tbl. F, U.S. CENsusBuREAu (visited Sept.
29, 1998)<http://www.census.gov/hheslwww/wealth/wlth93f.html>. SeegenerallyMEL VINL.
OLIvER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH, WHITE WEALTH (1995).
258. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 256, at 479 tbl. 745.
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41.5% of black children and 39.3% of Latino children fell below the poverty
line in 1995, compared to 15.5% of white children. 9 Moreover, the average
African American or Latino parent has accumulated substantially less formal
education than the average white parent. As of 1996, 82.8% of whites twenty-
five years and older had completed four years of high school, while only
74.3% of African Americans and 53.1% of Latinos had done so.2 ° Similarly,
24.3% of whites had finished four years of college, compared to 13.6% of
blacks and 9.3% of Latinos.26' Tellingly, the United Nations reported in 1993
that, according to its Human Development Index, which is based on a combi-
nation of per capita income, educational attainment, and longevity, the United
States ranked sixth in the world as a nation; white Americans by themselves
ranked first; and African Americans by themselves ranked thirty-first.262
As mentioned earlier, another important influence on academic achieve-
ment is the socioeconomic status of a student's peers.263 Unsurprisingly, a
concentration of poor students at a school has several deleterious effects on
the quality and effectiveness of the educational experience. High poverty
schools typically must devote a disproportionate share of their resources to
items such as remedial instruction, instruction in English as a second lan-
guage, emotional and developmental problems, security, and the supplementa-
tion of resources that students do not receive at home.2' Conversely, they are
less likely to offer gifted or advanced placement programs. 26 Teachers at
high poverty schools report that the problems of drug use, teenage pregnancy,
violence, possession of knives and handguns, and students' lacking basic
skills are either "serious" or "somewhat serious" at a significantly higher
rate.2" Teachers are also more likely to report student misbehavior that inter-
feres with instruction267 and less likely to report receiving significant support
259. See id. at 475 tbl. 737.
260. See id at 159 tbl. 243.
261. See id.
262. See Sunstein, supra note 19, at 2430 (citing UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME,
HUMAN DEV. REPORT 1993, at 18 & figs. 1.12-.13).
263. See supra note 183 and accompanying text
264. See generally GARY ORFIELDETAL., DEEPENING SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC
SCHOOLS (1997) (visited May 13,1998) <http://www.src.wl.com/scl92orfield.htm> [hereinaf-
ter DEEPENING SEGREGATION].
265. See ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 331,343.
266. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, NCES
96-133, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 141 (1996) [hereinafter DIGEST OF EDUCATION
STATISTICS].
267. See NATIONAL CENTERFOREDUCATION STATISTICS, U. S. DEP'TOF EDUCATION,NCES
97-388, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 7 & tbl. 5 (1997) [hereinafter THE CONDITION OF
EDUCATION] (showing that teachers in schools where 41% or more of students qualified for
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from parents.268 Those students who are prepared to excel academically tend
not to receive the same competition from their peers, and it is more difficult
for the school to create a culture in which academic excellence is respected
or valued. 9
These burdens, in turn, make it more difficult to hire or to retain highly
qualified faculty and staff. Fewer teachers in inner city schools have majored
or minored in their subject of instruction,27 and a much higher percentage of
teachers have either an emergency teaching credential or no credential at
all.271 Such schools suffer from more teaching vacancies,272 higher rates of
teacher turnover,' 3 and more frequentteacher absenteeism.274 Moreover, after
making the appropriate adjustments for relative purchasing power, high
poverty schools appear to receive below average funding for instruction.
According to one study, school districts with 5% or fewer households living
in poverty spent an average of $3514 per pupil in instructional expenditures
in 1990, while school districts in which 50% or more of the households fell
below the poverty line averaged $2479 per pupil. 275
reduced-price lunch were 2.2 times as likely to report level of student misbehavior that inter-
feres with instruction as teachers in schools with 5% or fewer eligible for reduced-price lunch).
268. See id at 8 & fig. 7 (showing that teachers in high poverty schools were more than
three times as likely as teachers in low poverty schools (38% vs. 12%) to report that "lack of
parent involvement was a serious problem").
269. See MASSEY&DENTON, supra note 180, at 168, 179 (discussing pressure on African
American students to avoid "acting white" in academic arena). But see Philip J. Cook & Jens
Ludwig, The Burden of"Acting White": Do BlackAdolescents Disparage Academic Achieve-
ment?, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra note 156, at 375, 392 (concluding that
"group differences in peer attitudes [do not] account for the black-white gap in educational
achievement," but that "disparities in the family backgrounds of blacks and whites do account
for the modest differences in effort that we find between the average black and white students").
270. See THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION, supra note 267, at 180.
271. See Quality Counts '98: The Teaching Challenge, EDUCATION WEEK ON THE WEB
(visited May 8, 1998) <http://www.edweek.orgsreports/qc98/hallenges/teach/te-n.htm> (show-
ing disparities in teaching credentials among schools).
272. See id. <http://www.edweek.orglsreportslqc98/Challenges/teach/te-c4.htm> (noting
that approximately 7% to 8% more urban districts than nonurban districts report teaching
vacancies in mathematics, physical sciences, and biology).
273. See id. <http:llwww.edweek.orglsreportsqc98/challenges/teach/te-c6.htm> (noting
that 58% of urban eighth graders attend schools in which at least one teacher leaves during
course of the academic year, compared to 27% of nonurban eighth graders).
274. See id <http://www.edweek.org/sreports/qc98/Challenges/teach/te-c3.htm> (noting
that 12% of urban eighth graders attend schools in which school officials say absenteeism
among teachers is problem, compared to 5% of nonurban eighth graders).
275. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION,
PROFILEOF CHILDRENINU.S. SCHOOL DISTRICTS 4-37 (1996). Butsee JENCKS, supra note 156,
at 9 ("Despite glaring economic inequalities between a few rich suburbs and nearby central
210
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Due to the higher rates of poverty for African Americans and Latinos,
as well as the residential segregation of metropolitan areas on the basis of
race and class,276 African American and Latino children suffer disproportion-
ately from these pathologies endemic to high poverty schools.27 Schools that
are predominantly minority are 16.3 times as likely to have high concentra-
tions of poor students than are schools that are predominantly white.278
Indeed, 87% of schools that are over 90% African American or Latino are
predominantly poor, and only 3% of such schools have fewer than 25% of
their students living in poverty.279 In America's largest urban school systems,
more than a third of African American students and almost half of Latino
children attend schools in which more than half the students are poor.280
Relatedly, a substantially higher percentage of black than white children
report that fellow students disrupted class in a manner that interfered with
learning;21 11.2% of African American children and 8.6% of Latino children
report that they have been threatened or injured with a weapon at school,
compared to 6.3% of white children; 2 and black and Latino children report
that they feel too unsafe to attend school at a rate nearly three times that of
whites.283 It is unsurprising, then, that African American and Latino children
cities, the average black child and the average white child now live in school districts that spend
almost exactly the same amount per pupil.").
276. It is important to note that residential racial segregation in the United States is not
simply a by-product of class segregation. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 180, at 125
(noting that poor African Americans are significantly more likely to live in neighborhoods of
extreme poverty than are poor whites).
277. See powell, supra note 8, at 790-91 & n.140; Tom Beimers, Note, A Wrong Still in
Search ofa Remedy: EducationalAdequacyAfler Sheffv. O'Neill, 82 MINN. L. REV. 565,572-
74 (1997) (describing formation of "cycle of social pathologies caused by intersection of
poverty, segregation, and racism"); cf Sheffv. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1280-81 (Conn. 1996)
(holding that racial and socioeconomic isolation of students in Hartford public schools deprived
them of equal educational opportunity guaranteed under state constitution). For anecdotal
accounts of the problems that plague high poverty schools, see generally ALEX KOTLOWITZ,
THERE ARE No CHILDREN HERE: THE STORY OF TWO Boys GROWING UP IN THE OTHER
AMERCA (1991); JONATHANKOZOL, SAVAGEINEQUALITIES: CHILDRENIN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS
(1992).
278. See ORFIELD ET AL., DEEPENING SEGREGATION, supra note 264.
279. See id.
280. See Orfield, supra note 181, at 861.
281. SeeNATIONAL CENTERFOREDUCATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'TOFEDUCATION,NCES
95-765, THE EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS OF BLACK STUDENTS 9 (1995) (noting that 76.3% of
black students reported that other students often disrupt class and that 51.1% reported that these
disruptions interfere with learning, compared to 69.9% and 36.7%, respectively, of white
students).
282. See DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS, supra note 266, at 139 tbl. 145.
283. See id
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continue to lag well behind whites on virtually every measure of academic
achievement.M
284. The average scores for white, black, and Latino students on the 1993-94 National




9-year-olds 218 185 186
13-year-olds 265 234 235
17-year-olds 296 266 263
MATHEMATICS
White Black Latino
9-year-olds 237 212 210
13-year-olds 281 252 256
17-year-olds 312 286 291
HISTORY
White Black Latino
4th graders 215 177 180
8th graders 267 239 243
12th graders 292 265 267
WRITING
White Black Latino
4th graders 217 175 189
8th graders 279 258 265
1 lth graders 294 263 274
SCIENCE
White Black Latino
9-year-olds 240 201 201
13-year-olds 267 224 232
17-year-olds 306 257 261
GEOGRAPHY
White Black Latino
4th graders 218 168 183
8th graders 270 229 239
12th graders 291 258 268
See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 256, at 178 tbl. 278.
As of 1988, black 17-year-old high school students were roughly half as likely as their
white counterparts to read at an "adept" level (25.8% vs. 46.3%) and one-third as likely to read
at an "advanced" level (1.9% vs. 5.7%). JENCKS, supra note 156, at 178 tbl. 5.9. Similarly, as
of 1986, white 17-year-old high school students were roughly three times as likely to be capable
of"moderately complex procedures and reasoning" in math (58.0% vs. 21.7%), and a remark-
able 25 times as likely to be capable of "multi-step problem solving and algebra" (7.6% vs.
0.3%). See id. at 178 tbl. 5.10. (Given that the gap in scores between whites and blacks on the
NAEP has actually increased since 1988, see STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 256, at 178
tbl. 278, these disparities may be even greater today.) According to the College Entrance
Examination Board, almost twice as many white students as African Americans ranked in the
top 10% oftheir class in 1995. See Adrian Wooldridge, A True Test, THENEwREPUBLIC, June
15, 1998, at 18, 20. While 21% of white high school students had "A" averages, only 8% of
black students did. See id. In 1997, the average score for white students on the verbal section
of the SAT was 526, compared to 466 for Latino students and 434 for African American
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Given the breadth and systemic nature of the causes of these racial
disparities, the expectation that courts would interpret Brown as requiring
formerly segregated school districts to produce substantial equality in educa-
tional achievement between white and minority students is fundamentally
inconsistent with the limited institutional role of the judiciary in American
government. Courts, lacking the flexibility, fact-finding abilities, or demo-
cratic legitimacy of the political branches, are ill-equipped to address the
myriad social conditions that, in combination, deprive minority children of an
equal chance at academic success. 25 The Court's recent decisions have made
students. See Newsfrom the College Board, COLLEGE BOARD ONLINE, tbl. 8 (visited June 15,
1998) <http://www.collegeboard.org/index this/press/senior97/table089.html>. On the math
section, whites averaged 526, Latinos averaged 468, and African Americans averaged 423. See
id. See generally JENCKS, supra note 156 (discussing persistence and causes of black-white test
score gap).
There are also significant disparities in high school graduation, college attendance, college
graduation, and graduate school attendance rates. In 1995, the high school drop out rate (per-
cent of 18- to 24-year olds who have not completed high school and are not presently enrolled)
was 14.4% for African Americans, 34.7% for Latinos, and 13.6% for whites. See STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT, supra note 256, at 175 tbl. 272. The college enrollment rate for whites in 1996 was
65.8%, compared to 55.3% for blacks and 50.7% for Latinos. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR
EDUCATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, DIGESTOF EDUCATION STATISTICS 194 tbl.
183 (1997). In 1988, the college graduation rate (percent of 25- to 29-year-olds reporting four
or more years of college) was 23.5% for whites and 12.3% for blacks. See JENCKS, supra note
156, at 174 tbl. 5.7. While constituting 11.4% of the total resident population 18 years and
older, African Americans represented only 7.2% of students enrolled in professional schools and
6.8% of students enrolled in graduate schools in 1995. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, NCES 98-015, ENROLLMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION:
FALL 1995,5,7 tbl. 1-3 (1997). Latinos, while constituting 9.2% ofthe total resident population
18 years and older, represented 4.6% of professional school students and 3.9% of graduate
school students. See id. By comparison, whites constitute 76.1% ofthe total resident population
18 years and older and represented 75% of professional school students and 74% of graduate
school students. See id. In 1996, 8.1% of whites held advanced degrees, compared to 3.6% of
blacks and 2.6% of Latinos. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 256, at 160 tbl. 245.
285. I do not mean here to leave the impression that all variance in academic achievement
between minority students, particularly African Americans, and white students is attributable to
differences in socioeconomic status, even broadly defined. Controlling for SES, white children
still outperform black children academically according to a variety of traditional measures. See
JENCKS, supra note 156, at 138-40 (stating that controlling for parents' years of education,
occupation, income, and family structure, white children score substantially higher than African
American children on standardized tests in vocabulary, reading comprehension, arithmetic
reasoning, and computational skills); id at 2 (noting that gap in test scores "shrinks only a little
when black and white families have the same amount of schooling, the same income, and the
same wealth"); Deborah C. Malamud,AffirmativeAction, Diversity, andthe BlackMiddle Class,
68 U. COLo. L. REV. 939, 978 (1997) ("Black middle-class children do worse in school than
(seemingly) similarly situated white middle-class children - which means that middle class
socioeconomic status is not as strong a predictor of educational success for blacks as it is for
whites."). There area variety of possible explanations for these disparities. Because ofresiden-
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desegregation's remedial framework marginally more restrictive than was
possible under a broader reading of Green and Swann, and perhaps these
additional restrictions were unwarranted, even after accounting for courts'
limited institutional capacities. But it is unrealistic to think that courts could
have produced something dramatically different. A relatively limited vision
of Brown was a predictable result of the institutional setting in which school
desegregation has unfolded.
In short, Orfield's conclusion that the Court has "quietly reversed" Brown
is hyperbole. It rests on an understanding of Brown that the Court never
endorsed - indeed, an understanding that is unrealistic to think American
courts could have ever seriously attempted to implement. The Court's recent
decisions are better understood as a constriction of the remedial framework
created by Green and Swann, limiting the breadth and duration of permissible
desegregation remedies. As a result of Milliken Iand the Rehnquist Court's
decisions, court-ordered desegregation plans are less ambitious and less
extensive than they might have otherwise been. This may be unfortunate, but
it is a less dramatic development than Dismantling Desegregation claims.
Likewise, Orfield's comparison of recent events to the collapse ofRecon-
struction is exaggerated."6 The Court's recent decisions have not encouraged,
endorsed, or reinstated segregation. 7 Instead, they likely reflect a pragmatic
judgment that, after roughly thirty years of court-ordered desegregation,
federal courts are no longer useful in remedying the effects of past de jure
discrimination in public schools, and that school districts and their students
would be better served if control over public education were in the hands of
politically accountable local officials rather than federal courts. Perhaps these
tial segregation on the basis of race that extends through all income classes, black middle-class
children are more likely to attend schools with high proportions of low-income students than are
white middle-class children. See id. at 978-79. For instance, between 1980 and 1985 nearly one
half of all nonpoor black children lived in census tracks where at least 20% of the residents were
poor, compared to only 6% ofnonpoor white children. See Phillips et al., supra note252, at 131.
In addition, awell-developed literature has revealed "the complexpsychosocial dynamics ofrace
in educational settings" that pressure black adolescents to underachieve academically and
"disidentify" from the educational process. See Malamud, supra, at 979-83; see also Claude M.
Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Test Performance of Academically
SuccessfulAfrican Americans, in THE BLACK-WHrrE TEsT SCORE GAP, supra note 156, at 401,
422 (describing the phenomenon of "stereotype threat," and concluding that "making African
Americans more conscious of negative stereotypes about their intellectual ability as a group can
depress their test performance relative to that ofwhites"). Finally, as William Julius Wilson has
argued, no measurable factors that are part of individual-level analysis will "capture the impact
of relational, organizational, and collective processes that embody the social structure of
inequality." William Julius Wilson, The Role ofthe Environment in the Black- White TestScore
Gap, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEsT SCORE GAP, supra note 156, at 501, 508.
286. See ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 31, 34, 43-44.
287. Cf id. at 24 (stating that "the current Court encourages resegregation").
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conclusions are unjustified, and desegregation remedies should not be so
restricted. But ending judicial supervision over formerly segregated school
districts, which may aggravate de facto segregation, is quite different from
Plessy's affirmation of Jim Crow. To equate the two is to ignore the funda-
mental distinction between government policies that are arguably indifferent
to the goal of remedying systemic racial inequalities, and those that reflect a
deliberate effort to subjugate a class of citizens on the basis of race."' The
Court's recent decisions might be described as callous, but unlike Plessy, they
are not grounded in the ideology of white supremacy.8 9
By constantly comparing the Court's apparent abandonment of court-
enforced desegregation remedies to the collapse of Reconstruction, Orfield
ahistorically implies that the periods share more than superficial similarities.
To be sure, the Court's recent decisions reflect a desire to replace federal
control with state and local sovereignty, even though racial injustice remains
an entrenched reality of American society. To say that these decisions have
constituted a second Redemption, however, greatly exaggerates their legal and
political significance.
1. Foundational Questions About the Continuation of
Court-Enforced Desegregation
Aside from the impact of the Supreme Court's recent decisions, Disman-
tling Desegregation raises a more fundamental question about the future of
school desegregation. Orfield's ultimate policy prescription is for district
courts to continue and to expand desegregation remedies until educational
opportunities for white and minority children are truly equal. In advocating
such an indefinite extension of court-ordered desegregation, however, Orfield
overlooks the ways in which such litigation might actually be detrimental to
the cause of educational equality. Clearly, educational opportunities remain
288. Cf Bickel, supra note 190, at 400-01 ("[Ihere is a moral difference between what
housing patterns do to schools, even where those patterns were encouraged by past government
policies, and what a legally enforced system of rigid segregation does to schools."). But cf
DerrickA. Bell, Jr., California 'sProposition 209: A TemporaryDiversion on theRoadtoRacial
Disaster, 30 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1447, 1455 (1997) (contending that"the Court's racial rhetoric
[closely] mirrors that of its late-nineteenth century predecessors" and that "Justice O'Connor's
opinions in particular contain the 'see no evil' approach of the Court in the CivilRights Cases").
289. Apassage from JusticeHarlan's dissent, historically hailed for its relative progressive-
ness, reveals the depth of the Plessy Court's commitment to racial superiority:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is,
in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not,
it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds
fast to the principles of constitutional liberty.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
215
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substantially unequal in American public schools; race remains strongly
correlated with academic. achievement. And school desegregation, at least
under certain circumstances, has helped mitigate these inequalities. But these
empirical truths do not require the conclusion that investing scarce resources
in court-enforced desegregation is a sound strategy for enhancing the educa-
tional opportunities of disadvantaged children.2"
First, as Dismantling Desegregation aptly demonstrates, desegregation
remedies are dramatically underinclusive as a means for mitigating racial
inequalities in public education.291 More precisely, the objectives attainable
through the continuation of such litigation are very limited compared to the
enormity of the problem of current racial disparities in educational opportu-
nity. This is partly due to the stage to which ongoing desegregation cases
have advanced. Most school districts that remain under federal court supervi-
sion have been implementing desegregation remedies for more than twenty
years and have substantially complied with their desegregation orders, even
if they have not fully attained unitary status. Thus, the prospect for new
findings of liability is largely nonexistent. The relevant question in most
cases is whether desegregation remedies will remain in place for a few more
years or instead will end immediately. Consequently, the benefits that might
flow from the continuation of judicial supervision in these districts may be
insubstantial relative to those that it has produced thus far.
More important, because the permissible goals of desegregation remedies
are narrowly circumscribed by the doctrine created by the Supreme Court,
they are capable of conferring only limited educational benefits on minority
children.2" Desegregation remedies are permissible only after a finding of a
dejure violation, and they must be limited to remedying those present effects
of discrimination that are proximately traceable to the constitutional violation.
Moreover, in all but the rarest cases, desegregation plans can only embrace a
single school district; thus, in most metropolitan areas, in which 90% of the
nation's minority students reside2' and in which well over half of the African
American and Latino students attend a school that is majority nonwhite,294
desegregation plans generally are limited to mixing students who are predomi-
nantly minority and largely poor. Finally, and most obviously, judicial
remedies are incapable of addressing the root causes of racial inequalities in
290. Cf RICHARD POSNER, EcoNoMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 654 (4th ed. 1992) (noting that
"[e]ven if black children benefit greatly. from integrated education, it does not follow that they
might not benefit even more from alternative strategies").
291. See ORFIELDETAL., supra note 2, at 345.
292. Indeed, this is precisely one of Orfield's chief criticisms of the Supreme Court's
decisions.
293. See Orfield, supra note 181, at 826.
294. See ic at 841 tbl. 3.
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educational opportunity, such as residential segregation, income and wealth
disparities, or high rates ofjoblessness.
The limited utility in continuing court-ordered desegregation remedies
would not, in itself, necessarily counsel their abandonment. If there were no
costs in the continuation of this litigation, it would certainly produce some
benefits and at least cause no harm. But investing resources in ongoing
desegregation cases could have two important effects that actually undermine
efforts to mitigate inequalities in educational opportunity. First, continuing
to pursue desegregation through the courts may promote a distorted and
counterproductive conception of the problem of racial inequality in public
education. Second, litigation may divert attention and resources from initia-
tives pursued through the political process, which, in the long run, offers the
only means for addressing the root causes of racial disadvantage in American
schools. As a result, it is possible that the continued pursuit of desegregation
through the courts could be counterproductive.
This is not to say that the continuation of court-enforced desegregation
necessarily is mistaken. The political process may be unlikely to produce any
serious efforts to address racial inequalities in education despite greater
mobilization; court-ordered remedies might be providing significant educa-
tional benefits to minority students in a particular community; or the continua-
tion of litigation might actually increase the likelihood of subsequent political
action by providing leverage againstthe school district orthe state government.
In these circumstances, the continuation of court-ordered desegregation may
remain a sensible means of expanding educational opportunities for minority
children. Even so, proponents ofjudicially-mandated desegregation, such as
Orfield, generally have failed to acknowledge that continuing to focus on the
courts has some significant drawbacks, and that it is possible thatthese adverse
consequences might actually exceed the benefits of court-ordered remedies.
A. The Perpetuation of the Compensatory Model
One potential adverse consequence from the continuation of court-
enforced desegregation is that it may foster an unhelpful and distorted concep-
tion of racial inequality in public education. Due to courts' limited institu-
tional capacities, they tend to create narrow conceptual models for addressing
the issues that come before them, even when the issue, properly understood,
is much broader that the model admits. These frameworks are better suited
to courts' traditional role of resolving disputes between particular parties and
meting out individualizedjustice. 2" They place definable limits on the breadth
of the relevant inquiry, and they translate the issues into concepts and terms
familiar to courts.
295. See CASS R. SuNSTEiN, THE PARTIAL CONSTTTION 319-20 (1993).
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School desegregation is an excellent example. While the social problems
implicated by Brown are exceptionally broad, the Supreme Court has created
a narrow doctrinal framework for desegregation cases largely modeled on the
private law of torts.296 First, remedies are only available upon the finding of a
discrete, actionable wrong by the school district-namely, intentional discrim-
ination. Broader ormore amorphous causes ofracial inequalities cannotjustify
judicial intervention. Second, as in tort law, the remedies for dejure segrega-
tion are compensatory in nature, aimingto "make whole" the victims ofdiscrim-
ination.297 As the Courthas stated frequently, the objective of every desegrega-
tion remedy must be to return the school district and its students to the position
that they would have occupied absent the unlawful discrimination.298
Clearly, the analogy to tort law is imperfect.2 Desegregation remedies
have not provided compensation to the direct, individual victims of segrega-
tion, namely those students who attended school while the system was dejure
segregated;3" rather, the victims who have been made whole are the school
district's students as a group, whose composition of individuals is constantly
changing. Nor have remedies for school segregation ever included money
damages.3"' Nonetheless, desegregation remedies are compensatory in the
sense that their nominal objective, as in tort law, is to restore the status quo
ante. °2 Hence, the scope of the violation necessarily determines the scope of
an appropriate remedy." 3 Because the only permissible objective for desegre-
gation remedies is to correct for the discrete dejure violation, they may only
address those conditions proximately traceable to the constitutional wrong."'
296. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Settlement ClassActions andthe Limits ofAdudication,
80 CORNELL L. REv. 1014, 1017 (1995); powell, supra note 8, at 768; Cass R. Sunstein, Three
Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CAL. L. REv. 751, 762 (1991) (arguing that Court's approach has
been "based on a narrow conception of compensation, linking public and private law").
297. See Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 259 (1991) (Marshall, 3., dissenting).
298. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 87 (1995) (noting that "desegregation remedy
'is necessarily designed, as all remedies are, to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to
the position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct"' (quoting Milliken 1, 418
U.S. 717, 746 (1974))); Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977) (quoting same).
299. See Liebman, supra note 164, at 1501-17 (critiquing descriptive accuracy of correc-
tive desegregation theory).
300. See id. at 1514.
301. See id. at 1508-09.
302. See Sunstein, supra note 296, at 763.
303. See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at88 ("MThenature ofthe desegregation remedy isto be deter-
mined by the nature and scope of the constitutional violation." (quoting Swam v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971))); Columbus Bd. ofEduc. v. Penick, 443 U.S.
449, 478 (1979) (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that "the scope
of the remedy is tied to the scope of the violation").
304. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 117 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating
that "[i]n order for a'vestige' to supply the ground for an exercise of remedial authority, it must
HeinOnline  -- 56 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 218 1999
A SECOND REDEMPTION?
The application of this model to school desegregation presents two
important problems. First, it has caused courts and litigants to engage in a
discourse of nonsense. Because the private law model is grounded in the
concepts of compensation and correction, an issue in every desegregation case,
and at virtually every stage of the litigation, is whether existing conditions
causally are related to the school district's constitutional violation."° Courts
must assess whether the existing racial compositions of the various facets of
a school district's operations, such as student assignments, faculty and staff
assignments, transportation, and extracurricular activities, differ from what
they would have been had the district never engaged indiscrimination. Butthis
question, particularly thirty years after the dejure violation, is unanswerable."°6
Given the intervening demographic changes and myriad potential influences,
it is impossible to ascertain what a school district would look like today had
there never been dejure segregation. The inquiry itself is incoherent.30 7
The problem is more acute in Milliken I!cases, such as Jenkins, in which
the identifiable injury from the dejure violation is a systemwide reduction in
student achievement. The appropriate remedy in such cases is compensatory
educational programs designed to enhance educational achievement in the
district. According to the corrective model, these programs may only aim to
eliminate the reduction in achievement attributable to the constitutional
violation.30 ' As the Court held in Jenkins, it is impermissible to determine
be clearly traceable to the dual school system"); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 491 (1992)
(holding that district court may discontinue remedies when "racial imbalance is not traceable,
in a proximate way, to constitutional violations"); Milliken , 418 U.S. 717,738 (1974) (stating
that goal of remedial process is to correct "the condition that offends the Constitution").
305. See Gewirtz, supra note 29, at 783-84.
306. See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 503 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Racially imbalanced schools
are.. the product of a blend of public and private actions, and any assessment that they would
not be segregated, or would not be as segregated, in the absence of a particular one of those
factors is guesswork."); SUNSTEIN, supra note 295, at 331; see also Lisa E. Chang, Remedial
Purpose and Affirmative Action: False Limits and Real Harms, 16 YALEL. &POL'YREV. 59,
84 (1997) (declaring that return to status quo ante is impossible goal).
307. As Sunstein has written,
[a]n inquiry into the amount of racial integration that would have occurred in a
world unaffected by racial segregation is likely to be empirically unanchored,
indeed, chimerical. Social scientists, let alone judges, are simply not equipped to
answer that question- not because they lack the appropriate tools, but because the
question itself is of uncertain epistemological status.
Sunstein, supra note 296, at 763-64; cf Liebman, supra note 164, at 1518-19 (stating that
corrective model fails to respond adequately to problems related to school segregation "for the
same reasons that private-law compensatory tort approaches fail to respond satisfactorily to
mass toxic disasters," as "both situations cause the correctively critical prerequisites of an
identifiable plaintiff and an identifiable defendant to elude proof").
308. SeeJenkins, 515 U.S. at 101 ("ThebasictaskoftheDistrictCourtisto decidewhether
the reduction in achievement by minority students attributable to prior dejure segregation has
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whether these programs have accomplished their objectives by reference to
external benchmarks, such as national norms on standardized test scores.3°
Rather, the district court somehow must determine whether present levels of
student achievement remain below what they would have been had the school
district never been segregated. Not only is such an inquiry beyond the compe-
tence of district courts, but it borders on the absurd.
The second and more practically significant problem with the compensa-
tory model is that it may perpetuate a distorted and counterproductive concep-
tion of the broader problem that proponents of school desegregation seek to
address. By focusing attention on the discrete act of dejure segregation and
its present effects - and discarding all other issues as immaterial - the model
defines the issue of educational inequality in dramatically underinclusive
terms. The goal of government intervention in this area should be to alleviate
the systemic racial disadvantages currently present in American education.310
That is, the objective should be to move towards a society in which race is not
strongly correlated with academic achievement. Whether all traces of past de
jure segregation have been eradicated, assuming we could ever know whether
such traces continue to exist, is immaterial to the achievement of racial
equality or racial justice, as those concepts are best understood.31 By focus-
ing exclusively on intentional discrimination and its proximate effects, court-
ordered desegregation may reinforce the conception common in the public
discourse about race that victims can be "made whole" through specific
remedies designed to compensate for discrete acts of past discrimination. It
may promote the distorted notion that our collective obligation is to provide
disadvantaged minority students with compensation for past discrimination,
rather than to address the causes of systemic disadvantage. 12
Perpetuating this conception of the problem may, in turn, create the
perception that once desegregation remedies have ended, the problem, how-
been remedied to the extent practicable.").
309. laM at 100-02.
310. Analogously, and more broadly, Sunstein has argued that "[t]he Fourteenth Amend-
ment is best conceived of as opposing" the caste-like features of American society, "a system
that turned the highly visible and morally irrelevant characteristic of race into a systemic basis
for second-class citizenship." Cass R. Sunstein, Public Deliberation, Affirmative Action, and
the Supreme Court, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1179, 1190 (1996). See generally Sunstein, supra note 19.
311. See Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and
the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953, 968 (1993) ("For black
people.., the fact of racial oppression exists largely independent of the motives or intentions
of its perpetrators."); Sunstein, supra note 296, at 771 (suggesting that it should not be "decisive
whether a present disadvantage can be tightly connected to an intentionally discriminatory act
by a public 'tortfeasor"' in determining whether collective action to address disadvantage is
appropriate).
312. See generally Sunstein, supra note 19.
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ever defined, has been solved."' A declaration that a school system has
achieved unitary status places the court's imprimatur on the conclusion that
the school district is now free from the effects of past discrimination. Such
an edict may carry the unfortunate implication that any remaining inequalities
are not the appropriate target of governmental action but, instead, the intracta-
ble product of private choices beyond social control, or the fault of children,
parents, educators, and administrators at the racially isolated schools. As
Orfield acknowledges,
[w]hen discrimination is officially declared to have fully been rectified and
the policies for resegregation are accepted by courts and community
leaders as educationally sound, the blame for the pervasive inequalities that
remain tends to be shifted to minority families and communities, the
teachers, and the educational leaders. When discrimination is declared
cured, the system can no longer be blamed.314
Thus, not only might litigation distort the societal conception of the problem
that desegregation seeks to address, it might also create false conceptions of
what has been accomplished and what forces are responsible for remaining
disparities. It may legitimate the racial inequalities that remain once litigation
has ended and deflate claims that these inequalities raise constitutional con-
cerns (even if those concerns are better addressed through political channels
than the courts)."' The replacement of court-ordered remedies with programs
adopted through the political process, whose existence would not depend on
a court's determination of unitary status, would ameliorate this concern.
In short, extricating school desegregation from the courts could have an
important beneficial effect on the public's conception of the problem of racial
inequality in America's schools. Pursuing other avenues for change may shift
313. See Klarman, supra note 123, at 948 (noting that "when the Court purports to solve
a constitutional problem, but the underlying grievance remains unredressed, it is plausible that
the legitimacy of that grievance is diminished"); Louis Michael Seidman, Brown andMiranda,
80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 717 (1992) (arguing that, by effectively defining equality in terms of
absence of legal separateness, Brown "served to... legitimate current arrangements," even
though "many blacks remained poor and disempowered"); cf Bell, supra note 288, at 1462
(contending that "victory in a social reform case leads to a passivity that undermines the action
that gives life to a cause and meaning to a belief").
314. ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 332; see Douglas, Justifying Racial Reform, supra
note 2, at 1183 (noting that when "notions of harm from the legacy of discrimination are
jettisoned, African Americans are increasingly vulnerable to claims that poor social, educa-
tional, and economic outcomes are a function of their own moral failure and pathology").
315. It is important to bear in mind that only a subset of all social and legal practices that
plausibly violate the Equal Protection Clause are susceptible to effective judicial remedies.
Thus, courts may decline to create broad remedial frameworks for certain inequalities not
because those inequalities do notraise legitimate constitutional concerns but because thejudici-
ary would be an inappropriate institution for addressing the problem.
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attention from the narrow objective of compensating the victims of past de
jure segregation to the more pertinent goal of eliminating systemic racial
disadvantage in public education.
B. The Comparative Advantages of the Political Mobilization
Another potential cost in continuing court-ordered desegregation is that it
may divert attention and resources from political mobilization around the issue
of racial inequality in public education." 6 Granted, the prospects for serious
political efforts to redress systemic racial disadvantage in American education
in the near future appear less than outstanding. Several high-profile political
initiatives have been distinctly hostile to redistributive efforts, particularly
wherethey appearto bestowdisproportionatebenefits onracialminorities. The
adoption by voters in California' 7 and Washington318 of ballot initiatives that
prohibit affirmative action by the state or its political subdivisions and the
recent federal welfare reform 9 are prominent examples. Congress has even
rejected the Clinton Administration's rather tame proposals to assist school
districts in funding capital improvements to dilapidated public schools.320
Nonetheless, there are reasons to think that, in the long run, initiatives
pursued through the political process might produce more meaningful gains
for disadvantaged students than will ongoing desegregation litigation.32" ' First,
recent scholarship has demonstrated that courts may be largely ineffective as
engines of social change. Gerald Rosenberg's thoughtful study has called into
question the utility of school desegregation litigation in particular.3" Accord-
ing to Rosenberg's accumulation of evidence, Brown had little or nothing to
do with the actual desegregation of American public schools. Little desegre-
316. See Bell, supra note 288, at 1462; Klarman, supra note 123, at 948-49.
317. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 3 1(a) ("The state shall not discriminate against, or grant prefer-
ential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national
origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.").
318. See Tom Brune& Joe Heim, New Battle Begins: Interpreting Law, SEATrLETIMES,
Nov. 4, 1998, atB1.
319. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
320. See Peter Applebome, Budget Deal Killed Money for Repairing the Schools, N.Y.
TIMES, May 9, 1997, at A14 (reporting defeat of education bill); Washington in Brief: Senate
Rejects Democratic Education Bills, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 1998, at A6 (same).
321. See Brett McDonnell, Comment, Dynamic Statutory Interpretations and Sluggish
Social Movements, 85 CAL. L. REv. 919, 920 (1997) (using game theoretic models to contend
that, in area of civil rights, "activists concentrating on short-run gains in court have lost broader
social support in the long run").
322. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOuT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 42-169 (1991).
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gation occurred in the ten years following Brown; as of 1964, more than
99.5% of African American students in the South, excluding Texas and
Tennessee, still attended all-black schools.3" Desegregation did not begin in
earnest until the 1965-66 school year," after Congress had enacted the Civil
Rights Act of 1964"z and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965 (ESEA).326 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act forbade racial discrimination
by entities receiving federal funds, and the ESEA made billions of dollars
available to public school districts.327 Using Title VI, the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare made the disbursement of ESEA funds
contingent on school districts' abandonment of segregation.328 Gradually, this
financial incentive, coupled with the Justice Department's active involvement
in desegregation litigation under a separate provision of the Civil Rights Act,
caused many school systems to abandon their dejure policies and desegregate
their schools. 29 By the 1972-73 school year, 91.3% of black students in the
South were attending integrated schools.
330
These legislative and executive actions were in direct response to the
political pressure created by the modem civil rights movement, which
Rosenberg plausibly contends was largely unrelated to, and unaffected by,
Brown.33' Other scholars, most notably Michael Klarman, also have ques-
tioned the impact of Brown on the desegregation of America's schools 32 and
323. See id. at 50.
324. See id. at 42-54.
325. Pub. L. No.88-352,78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e
to 2000e-17 (1994)).
326. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27(1965).
327. See Joondeph, supra note 8, at 605.
328. See ROSENBERG, supra note 322, at 47-50; Michael . Klarman, Brown, Racial
Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REv. 7, 43 & n.160 (1994).
329. See Joondeph, supra note 8, at 605-06.
330. See ROSENBERG, supra note 322, at 50.
331. See id. at 107-69.
332. See Klarman, supra note 328, at 99-105; Michael J. Klarman, CivilRights Law: Who
Made It and How Much Did It Matter?, 83 GEo. L.J. 433, 440-50 (1994) (book review); cf
Davison M. Douglas, The Limits ofLaw in AccomplishingRacial Change: School Segregation
in the Pre-Brown North, 44 UCLA L. REV. 677, 744 (1997) (contending that "[tihe northern
desegregation experience.., suggests that the best strategy for securing racial reform is to
utilize a variety of tactics - including but not limited to traditional litigation campaigns - to
build political and cultural support for the reformist agenda' and that "litigation and even
legislative strategies are not likely to translate into meaningful change unless they are reinforced
by broader cultural support"). Klarman agrees with Rosenberg that Brown did not directly
influence the civil rights movement or civil rights legislation, but contends that it did so
indirectly by prompting a conservative shift in racial politics in the South. See Klarman, supra
note 328, at 97-118. This shift led to dramatic confrontations between southern segregationists
and civil rights demonstrators in places such as Little Rock, Ole Miss, Birmingham, and Selma.
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more generally have challenged the assumption that courts can act in a genu-
inely countermajoritarian fashion to protect the interests of minority groups.33
The point here is not that the judiciary's involvement in school desegre-
gation has been ineffectual. As other commentators have noted, Rosenberg's
analysis fails to capture the indirect and intangible ways in which Brown
altered the landscape and discourse surrounding civil rights. 34 Even if the
elected branches ultimately were responsible for desegregating America's
schools, Brown, by placing the weight of the Fourteenth Amendment behind
the mandate to desegregate, altered the backdrop against which subsequent
political events unfolded. 35 Thus, the contention that Brown had no impact
on school desegregation seems implausible. Moreover, courts, even if not
strongly countermajoritarian, may nonetheless instigate changes that, at the
margin, the political branches otherwise would have foregone. 36 Nonetheless,
See id at 118-29. The broadcast of these confrontations on national television profoundly
affected national public opinion about civil rights, which, in combination with other influences,
led to the landmark civil rights legislation of the 1960s. See id at 141-49. Klarman asserts that
the elimination of racial segregation produced by this legislation was, from a long-term
perspective, inevitable, but that it occurred in the mid-1960s because of the southern backlash
against Brown. See id. at 10-11.
333. See Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and CivilLiberties Revolutions,
82 VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1996). Klarman contends that the Supreme Court has intervened to protect
the interests of minorities only to impose the national consensus on an issue on a region that
remains an outlier or, more rarely, to take sides on a genuinely divisive issue where popular
opinion is roughly split, such as in Roe v. Wade. See id. at 16-17. Klarman does not assert that
the Court has had no countermajoritarian function, but that its "capacity to protect minority
rights is more limited than most justices or scholars allow." Id. at 6.
334. See, e.g., Michael A. Middleton, The Efficacy of Litigation in Achieving Racial
Justice, LAW & CouRTs, Summer 1996, at 7, 9; David Schultz & Stephen E. Gottlieb, Legal
Functionalism and Social Change: A Reassessment of Rosenberg's The Hollow Hope: Can
Courts Bring About Social Change?, 12 J.L. & POL. 63, 73-77 (1996); Sunstein, supra note 19,
at 2426 ("A degree of agnostism makes good sense here."); Neal Devins, Judicial Matters, 80
CAL. L. REv. 1027, 1039-46 (1992) (book review); David L. Kirp, How Now, Brown, 254
NATION 757 (1992) (book review); Peter H. Schuck, Public Law Litigation andSocial Reform,
102 YALE L.J. 1763, 1771-72 (1993) (book review).
335. See, e.g., TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS
1954-63, at 124 (1988) (writing that Brown "had brought fresh excitement to the NAACP" in
Alabamajust before Montgomery Bus Boycott); DAYBREAK OF FREEDOM: THE MONTGOMERY
Bus BOYCOTT 57 (Stuart Bums ed., 1997) (noting that, four days after Court decided Brown,
"an English professor at Alabama State College in Montgomery wrote a letter to the mayor
urging him to accept minor reforms to improve the treatment of black passengers on the city's
segregated buses"); David J. Garrow, Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist Devaluing of
Brown v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REv. 151 (1994) (contending that significant historical
evidence reveals Brown's impact on civil rights movement and Montgomery Bus Boycott in
particular).
336. See Michael Heise, Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and Statehouses: Educational
Finance, Constitutional Structure, and the Separation ofPowers Doctrine, 33 LAND & WATER
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Rosenberg and Klarman present historically-grounded reasons to doubt the
capacity of courts, at least without the active support of the elected branches,
to produce substantial change in this area.337
Second, efforts to improve educational opportunities for disadvantaged
students through the political process enjoy the advantage of not being con-
strained by the narrow strictures of the Supreme Court's desegregation doc-
trine. This advantage should be most apparent to those, such as Orfield, who
are convinced that school desegregation remains a promising strategy for
mitigating inequalities in educational opportunity. Desegregation plans
adopted legislatively could embrace any school district, not just those found
liable of dejure segregation; they could encompass entire metropolitan areas,
cultivating socioeconomic integration; they could place a high priority on
desegregating kindergarten and elementary school students, in which desegre-
gation is most likely to produce meaningful academic gains; they could
accommodate and account for the integration of students from a wide variety
of racial and ethnic backgrounds, rather than only those groups for whom
there is proof of past discrimination; and they could operate indefinitely, not
just until the vestiges of de jure segregation have been eliminated. More
generally, in approaching educational reform, the political branches could
experiment, devising more creative and flexible programs informed by their
greater fact-finding capacities, and they would not be moored to the limited
objective of achieving greater racial balance. The school choice initiatives
adopted in Cleveland and Milwaukee, which have permitted low-income
inner-city students to enroll in private schools or surrounding public school
districts,338 and the urban residential academies that have started, or will soon
start, in Trenton, Washington, D.C., Boston, and throughout Minnesota,339 are
two examples.
An important caveat is in order. According to the Supreme Court's recent
affirmative action and redistricting decisions, any educational reforms that
explicitly classify students on the basis ofrace, or forwhich race is the predomi-
nantfactor in definingtherelevantclass, are in substantialjeopardyofviolating
the Equal Protection Clause. In decisions such as Richmond v. J.A. Croson
L. REV. 281, 306 (1998) (discussing possibility of such phenomenon in reference to school
finance reform).
337. See Bell, supra note 288, at 1462 ("In my experience, we who advocate social reform
grant litigation a spotlight larger than anything judicial decisions can achieve - particularly in
the long term.").
338. See James Brooke, Minorities Flock to Cause of Vouchers for Schools, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 27, 1997, at Al; John B. Judis, Bad Choice, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 30, 1996, at 6.
Interestingly, support for voucher plans appears to be strongest among African Americans and
Hispanics, particularly those who are poor. See Brooke, supra, at Al.
339. See Mark Francis Cohen, People's Prep, THENEw REPUBLIC, June 15, 1998, at 13.
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Co.,34° Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,34' and Shaw v. Hunt,342 the Court
has reiterated that "all racial classifications, imposed bywhatever federal, state,
or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by areviewing court under strict
scrutiny. 3 4' Further, at least with respect to government contracts, the only
state interest that is sufficiently compelling to justify explicit racial classifica-
tions is to remedy the present effects of past discrimination,3" and governmen-
tal actors "must identify that discrimination, public or private, with some
specificity before they may use race-conscious relief." 45 Justice Powell's
opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,14' which repre-
sented his view alone but announced the judgment for the Court, stated that
racial diversity was a compelling state interest that justified using race as a
"plus factor" in the student admissions process. 47 But it is unclear whether this
aspect of Bakke remains good law. The Fifth Circuit has rejected Bakke's
diversity rationale, concluding that the Court's decisions in Croson and
Adarandhave foreclosed the possibility that diversity can be acompelling state
interest. 4 And the First Circuit recently struck down the Boston School Com-
mittee's use ofrace in selecting students for the city's three public examination
schools (though the court reserved the question of whether diversity could ever
be a compelling interest in the context of education).349 Thus, an explicitly
race-based desegregation plan might be unconstitutional unless it is based on
a specific finding that existing racial imbalances were attributable to past
discriminationwithinthat community, and itisnarrowlytailoredtoremediating
those present effects."'
340. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
341. 515 U.S. 200(1995).
342. 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
343. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
344. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989) (stating that race-conscious
remedies must be "strictly reserved for remedial settings").
345. Id. at 504.
346. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
347. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-13 (1978).
348. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944-45 (5th Cir.) (striking down University of
Texas's consideration of race in admitting students to law school as violation of Equal Protec-
tion Clause), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
349. Wessman v. Gitlens, No. 98-1657, 1998 WL 792148, at*7-* 10, *21 (1 st Cir. Nov. 19,
1998) (concluding that goal of racial diversity did not justify School Committee's admissions
guidelines because the "racial/ethnic guidelines appear to be less a means of attaining diversity
in any constitutionally relevant sense and more a means for racial balancing"). See generally
Tamar Lewin, Public Schools Confronting Issue of Racial Preferences; Growing Number of
Parents, Mostly White, Challenge Policies They Deem Unfair, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1998, § 1,
at 1.
350. ButcfBrown,supranote 197,at 1032-40(arguingthatmandatory desegregationplans
adopted in absence of federal constitutional violation should be upheld as narrowly tailored to
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Nonetheless, this "colorblind" interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause should not pose a significant barrier to education reforms intended to
mitigate racial inequalities. Given the high degree of existing residential
segregation, both in terms of race and socioeconomic status, programs that
classify students on the basis of where they live, such as by neighborhood or
school district, would successfully identify students who are racially isolated
and socioeconomically disadvantaged without any explicit racial classifica-
tion. For instance, a program that permitted students in the Kansas City,
Missouri, school district to enroll in any one of the surrounding suburban
districts would place many disadvantaged minority students in relatively
affluent, predominantly white schools. So long as race is not the "predomi-
nant, overriding factor" in defining the class of students eligible to participate,
the program would be subject only to rationality review and clearly would
pass constitutional muster.3"
A more fundamental advantage of political mobilization over litigation
is that the political process provides the only mechanism for directly address-
ing the root causes of racial inequalities in public education. Again, the
reasons that race remains strongly correlated with academic achievement in
American society are structural and systemic. They are interconnected with
disparities in wealth and income, residential segregation on the basis of race
and class, access to health care, susceptibility to crime and violence, and the
prevalence ofjoblessness, drug dependency, teenage pregnancy, and single-
parent families in predominantly minority communities. They are a product
of the broader racial inequalities in American society - inequalities that
courts, because of their limited institutional competence, are incapable of
seriously addressing on their own. Although courts might play some role in
instigating social change, only the political branches, with their broader
powers, their flexibility and fact-finding capacities, and their democratic
legitimacy, can tackle these problems directly.35
compelling interest of enabling students to make informed choices about lives that they will lead
and values ofracial and ethnic toleration). For athorough analysis ofthe Court's recent affirma-
tive action decisions concluding thatBakke's diversity rationale remains good law, see generally
Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1745 (1996).
351. Cf Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 910 (1995) (holding that state's use of race as
"predominant, overriding factor" in drawing boundaries of voting district is subject to strict
scrutiny); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987). The McCleskey court stated:
"[D]iscriminatory purpose" ... implies more than intent as volition or intent as
awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker, in this case a state
legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part
"because of," notmerely "in spite of," its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.
Id. (quoting Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (footnote and citation
omitted)).
352. See Sunstein, supranote 19, at2439-40; Sunstein, supranote296, at768-69,771-72;
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Finally, initiatives pursued through the political process can produce
collateral benefits unavailable through litigation. 53 As Cass Sunstein has
noted, political action can cultivate "a kind of citizen mobilization that is a
public and a private good, and can inculcate political commitments, broader
understanding, feelings of citizenship, and dedication to the community."354
Participation in the political process as mobilized citizens can enhance individ-
uals' sense of power and responsibility in shaping collective priorities. It can
educate citizens, deepen personal commitments to the achievement ofsubstan-
tive objectives, and produce longer-lasting political support for specific policy
goals.
355
The modem civil rights movement is a poignant example. Not only did
the movement lead to tangible legislative action, including the Civil Rights
Act, the Voting Rights Act, and the Fair Housing Act, but it also cultivated a
broad commitment to active participation in the political process. This
mobilization of citizens shaped American politics for several years, spilling
over into the antiwar, environmental, and women's rights movements. Nota-
bly, the leaders of the civil rights movement focused consciously on the
political process and not the courts.356 For instance, Martin Luther King wrote
that when litigation had been "the sole form of activity [in the movement], the
ordinaryNegro was involved as a passive spectator. His interests were stirred,
cf. Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 23, 58 (1998) (proposing reorganization
of public schools around idea of"community building" that "abandons the historic reliance of
integration proponents on government orders and court mandates").
353. Michael Walzer has recently argued that American democracy, when properly
functioning, relies on a"balance of action" among mobilization, deliberation, and litigation, and
that our increasing reliance on litigation as a source of democratic politics has undermined
mobilization and weakened the deliberative process. See Michael Walzer, Crass Demos, THE
NEw REPUBLIC, June 8, 1998, at 11, 11-12.
354. Sunstein, supra note 296, at 767.
355. See Kathryn Abrams, Law's Republicanism, 97 YALEL.L 1591, 1598 (1988) (refer-
ring to "moral and political benefits from the self-conscious mobilization" in Bruce Ackerhian's
theory of "constitutional moments"); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97
YALE L.J. 1539, 1547 (1988) (explaining that political participation can cultivate qualities of
"self-development, feelings of empathy, [and] social solidarity"); Walzer, supra note 353, at I I
(describing how citizen mobilization can transform individuals into "effective agents of
democratic politics"). But see Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and
RacialPolitics, 97 YALE L.J. 1609, 1612 (1988) (noting that"[t]he virtuous citizen... can only
be free to pursue his human essence through civic participation and through the life of the mind
by having the luxury of material independence").
356. See Cass R. Sunstein, What the Civil Rights Movement Was and Wasn't (with Notes
on Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X), 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 191, 198-200 (discussing
commitment to political participation by King, Malcolm X, and Students for a Democratic
Society).
228
HeinOnline  -- 56 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 228 1999
A SECOND REDEMPTION?
but his energies were unemployed." '357 King believed that a "a deeper involve-
ment as a group in political life will bring [African Americans] more inde-
pendence. Consciously and creatively developed, political power may well,
in the days to come, be the most effective new tool of the Negro's libera-
tion."35' To King, it was imperative that African Americans
become intensive political activists. We must be guided in this direction
because we need political strength more desperately than any other group
in American society. Most of us are too poor to have adequate economic
power, and many of us are too rejected by the culture to be part of any
tradition of power. Necessity will draw us toward the power inherent in
the creative use of politics.359
The point is not that Brown was either insignificant or unsuccessful.
Indeed, much evidence indicates that court-ordered desegregation has contrib-
uted to the substantial reduction in achievement gaps between white and
minority children over the past forty years.3" But there are reasons to reexam-
ine strategies that rely heavily on courts to produce meaningful social change.
Although Orfield concedes that "[c]ourts are not ideal institutions for restruc-
turing racial opportunity in schools,"36' this only admits that, in an ideal
world, the political branches would be preferable to the judiciary for imple-
menting reform.362 This concession fails to acknowledge that the continuation
of desegregation litigation could produce significant adverse consequences
that, in some cases, might actually aggravate the problem of racial inequality
in public schools. In short, when all systemic effects are considered, the
wisdom of investing resources in the continuation of court-ordered desegrega-
tion remedies is an extremely complicated, and largely unanswered, empirical
question.
Conclusion
Frustration with the apparent end of court-enforced desegregation is
understandable. Despite forty-four years under Brown, significant disparities
in educational opportunity between white and minority students persist. We
357. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 566 (James M. Washington ed., 1986) (quoted in Sunstein, supra
note 356, at 199).
358. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WArr 150-51 (1964).
359. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHEREDOWEGOFROMHERE: CHAOS OR COMMUNITY?
181 (1967).
360. See supra notes 156-74 and accompanying text.
361. ORMLD ETAL., supra note 2, at 349.
362. I am indebted to Jim Ryan for clarifying this distinction.
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know a great deal about a child's likelihood of academic success simply from
knowing his race. The average test scores for African American and Latino
students remain well below those for white students at every age and in every
subject area. Blacks and Latinos are more likely than whites to drop out of
high school, and they are substantially less likely to attend college, graduate
from college, or attend graduate school.
The best understanding of racial inequality in American education is as
a problem of systemic disadvantage. Disparities in wealth, income, and
parents' educational backgrounds, residential segregation on the basis of race
and class, inadequate access to health care, and disproportionate rates of
crime, violence, and drug use in predominantly minority neighborhoods, as
well as the persistence and historical impact of racism, combine to deprive
minority children of an equal chance at academic success. Thus, eliminating
the vestiges of official discrimination committed by formerly segregated
school districts - the avowed goal of court-ordered desegregation remedies -
is largely irrelevant. Indeed, the notions of compensation and correction,
although supplying additional moral force to the case for racially redistribu-
tive measures, arguably are immaterial to the project of creating a society in
which race is not correlated with academic achievement. The objective of
governmental intervention should be to address the causes of systemic disad-
vantage, whatever their relation to past discrimination.
For these reasons, the continuation of court-ordered desegregation may
not be a constructive means to expand educational opportunities for minority
children. The doctrinal constraints on permissible desegregation remedies, as
well as the late stage to which most desegregation cases have advanced, mean
that the educational benefits available through judicial remedies are dramati-
cally underinclusive relative to the breadth of the problem. More important,
the continuation of litigation could have unfortunate, unintended conse-
quences. First, the judicial framework for implementing desegregation
remedies may foster an unduly narrow understanding of the problem of racial
disparities in education, perpetuating the fundamental misconception that the
issue is one of compensation for discrete wrongs in the past. Second, litiga-
tion may divert attention and resources from efforts to initiate change through
the political process, which offers several advantages over courts as a mecha-
nism for addressing the broad and systemic causes of educational inequalities.
While the present political climate may seem inhospitable to initiatives
addressing these disparities, there are some grounds for optimism. In the last
three years, California has invested billions of dollars to reduce class sizes to
twenty students or fewer in kindergarten through third grade,363 and it has
363. See Funding for Class-Size Reduction Program, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1998, at B5.
According to the California Department of Education, 90% of first and second grade students
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undertaken significant "whole school change" reforms at high poverty schools
that have already raised student achievement." In 1997, Illinois reformed its
school financing scheme to increase its foundational aid to public school
districts, providing an additional $485 million to the state's poorest systems. 65
New York recently increased its state funding for primary education by $950
million, much of which is earmarked for programs that specifically benefit
poor systems, such as universal prekindergarten classes and aid for teachers'
salaries in poor urban districts."6 Maryland enacted legislation in 1997 to
provide $254 million in additional funding for troubled inner-city schools in
Baltimore. 6 And several states recently have adopted open enrollment mea-
sures that allow students to attend public schools outside their home
districts. 6
Perhaps the most salutary development is Missouri's adoption ofabroad-
ranging legislative plan that, contingent upon a settlement of the St. Louis
case, would replace court-ordered desegregation remedies in Kansas City and
St. Louis. 69 The legislative program, enacted in May 1998, would offer
and 70% of kindergarten and third grade students attend classes with 20 or fewer students. See
id.
364. See Rene Sanchez, CleaningHouse Helps Troubled Calif Schools, WASH.POST, June
6, 1998, at Al (describing reforms in San Francisco Unified School District, in which test
scores at schools with most disadvantaged students have risen steadily over past five years). But
cf Kelly C. Rozmus, Education Reform and Education Quality: Is Reconstitution the Answer?,
1998 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 103, 138-40 (contending that results from San Francisco's reforms
have been mixed).
365. See Rick Pearson, Legislators Get Message, Pass School-FundBill, CHI. TRIB., Dec.
3, 1997, at 1.
366. See Abby Goodnough, StateLegislatureApproves$95OMillionlncrease inSpending
for Education, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1998, at B1.
367. See Michael Abramowitz & Terry M. Neal, '97 Assembly a Mixed Bag for
Glendening; Tax Cut a Plus, but SchoolAid Victory Could Come Back to Haunt Him, WASH.
PosT, Apr. 8, 1997, at DI.
368. See Erica J. Rinas, Note, A Constitutional Analysis of Race-Based Limitations on
Open Enrollment in Public Schools, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1501, 1501 & n.1 (1997) (describing
open enrollment programs around country); CENTER FOR EDUCATION REFORM, EDUCATION
REFORM NATIONWiDE: STATE BY STATE SUMMARY (visited May 21, 1998) <http://edreform.
comlpubs/stxsts97.htm> (same).
369. See Will Sentell, School Measure OK'a4 Ending Divisive Campaign; But St. Louis
Must Settle Lawsuit Before KC Gets $40 Million, KAN. CITY STAR, May 16, 1998, at A12;
Virginia Young, Legislature OKs Bill that Could Close Desegregation Case, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, May 16, 1998, at 14. After the Supreme Court's decision in Jenkins, the KCMSD
and the State of Missouri reached an agreement to end judicial remedies in Kansas City by
1999, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's approval ofthe settlement See Jenkins
v. Missouri, 122 F.3d 588, 600-05 (8th Cir. 1997); Lynn Horsley & Will Sentell, KC Board,
State Agree to EndAid: Desegregation Payments Would Stop in 19991fJudgeApproves, KAN.
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several benefits unavailable through the continuation of litigation. For in-
stance, it would expand the resources of several predominantly minority,
predominantly poor school districts that were not parties to the litigation but
which suffer from problems similar to those in Kansas City and St. Louis.37
It would continue state funding for a voluntary interdistrict transfer plan in
metropolitan St. Louis, which permits approximately 13,000 inner city stu-
dents to enroll in more affluent suburban schools,37' and it would permanently
adjust the state education funding formula to provide additional resources to
districts that enroll higher proportions of students living in poverty." Most
important, the legislation would effectively redefine the objective of these
educational programs. Because the continuation of these programs would not
be contingent on the persistence of vestiges of the de jure system, and the
programs would embrace school districts not found liable for segregation, the
purpose of the programs would no longer be compensatory. Rather, they are
consciously forward-looking, seeking to address the problems that face the
state's disadvantaged students regardless of their cause. Although the legisla-
tion represents only a small step towards racial equality in Missouri's schools,
its several benefits could make it a model for the settlement of ongoing
desegregation cases throughout the country. It represents a constructive use
of the leverage of ongoing litigation to forge a more lasting political solution.
This is not to say that the continuation of court-ordered desegregation
will necessarily be counterproductive or that efforts to produce change
through the political process will necessarily be forthcoming or successful.
Whether the continuation of desegregation litigation will improve educational
opportunities for minority children in any particular community is an ex-
tremely complicated empirical question. Rather, the important lesson is that
the shortcomings of court-ordered desegregation remedies present a basis for
at least questioning the wisdom of court-centered strategies at this stage of the
desegregation saga. More broadly, we should be mindful that the major
redistributive initiatives of this century - the New Deal and the civil rights
movement- almost exclusively were the product of political mobilization and
deliberation. It seems likely that the same will be true of any truly effective
efforts in the future to mitigate racial inequalities in America's public schools.
CITY STAR, May 23, 1996, at Al. The parties to the St. Louis desegregation litigation have been
in negotiations to reach a settlement since 1996. See Tim Bryant, William Danforth Gets Key
Desegregation Role: Ex-WU Chancellor to Seek Agreement, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr.
24, 1996, atBI.
370. See Young, supra note 369, at 14.
371. See id.
372. See id.
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